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INVENTION PATENTABILITY

[TJhe technology is perhaps mathematically awesome, the economic impact of our decision tremendous .... I
[T]he line of demarcation between a patentable and an unpatentable (or non-patentable) claim does not always shimmer with
clarity .... 2
With the advent of the decisions by the United States Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr3 and Diamond v. Bradley,4 and the recent decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
in In re Taner,5 over a decade of confusion concerning the patenta6
bility of inventions involving computer software and algorithms
may be resolved. The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), in following the spirit of these decisions, has reversed its
long standing practice of rejecting most claims drawn to computer
program or algorithm-related inventions and has drawn guidelines
7
for deciding which categories of these inventions are patentable.
This study will trace the development of the law dealing with
the patenting of software and algorithm related inventions, discuss
the present status of the law in this field as a result of the 1981 Bradley and Diehr decisions of the Supreme Court and the 1982 Taner
decision by the CCPA, and demonstrate how these developments
have affected patenting in the exemplary field of seismic data
processing.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY

A. MECHANICAL COMPUTERS
The first recorded mechanization of computation involved Gerbert of Aurillac and Magnus in the 10th century.8 In the 16th century, Emperor Rudolfuss II of the Holy Roman Empire granted a
1. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
2. Arshal v. United States, 621 F.2d 421, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1981).
3. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Diehr's patent application was assigned to Federal Mogul
Corporation.
4. 450 U.S. 381 (1981). Bradley's patent application was assigned to Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc.
5. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
6. See Schuyler, Examination of Patent Applications on Computer ProgramsNature of Decision of Guidelines, 868 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 349 (1969); Guidelines to
Examination of Programs, 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1 (1966).
7. Examination of Patent Applications Involving Mathematical Algorithms or
Computer Programs, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2110. See Appendix
for full text. See also PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Oct. 22, 1981, at A-7, E1.
8. J. ROSENBERG, THE COMPUTER PROPHETS 20-21 (1969).
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patent for a programmed recording pedometer which was used in
surveying. 9 In the 17th century, mechanical calculators capable of
adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing were invented. Louis
XIV granted a patent to Pascal in 1649 for an arithmetic calculating
machine that was programmable for various coinage systems. 10 In
1709, Poleni developed the first calculator that provided a series of
answers to appropriate problems." Weaving looms were automated
by Jacquard in 1804, by using punched tapes or cards. Between 1833
and 1835, Charles Babbage designed two general purpose digital
computers programmed by punch cards, one a "difference engine"
12
and one an "analytical engine.'
B.

ELECTROMECHANICAL COMPUTERS

The first electromechanical computers were developed shortly
after World War II by Stiblitz of Bell Laboratories and Aiken of
Harvard University with the support of IBM and the Office of Naval
Research.' 3 Aiken's computer utilized the principles of Babbage's
general purpose digital computer but employed electrical circuitry
in place of mechanical elements.
C. ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS
The first general purpose, all electronic digital computer, the
ENIAC,14 was built with vacuum tubes at the University of Pennsylvania in 1946.15 Over the next ten years vacuum tube computers
16
were built using storage devices such as electrostatic memories,
delay line memories, 17 and magnetic drum memories. 18 These early
computers were externally programmed using wired control
9. A. RHODE,

DIE GESCHICHTE

DER WISSENSCHAFrLICHEN

INSTRUMENTE

VOM

BEGINN DER RENASSANCE BIS ZUM AUSGANG DES 18, JAHRHUNDERTS (1923).
10. Prager, Examination of Inventionsfrom the Middle Ages to 1836, 46 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 268, 280 (1964).
11. D. HALAcY, CHARLES BABBAGE, FATHER OF THE COMPUTER (1970).
12. CHARLES BABBAGE, AND HIS CALCULATING ENGINES: SELECTED WRITINGS
(1961).
13. Fagan, Impact, BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES 115 (1971).
14. ENIAC stands for Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer. Patent
No. 3,120,606 was granted to Eckert and Mauchly for the ENIAC.
15. Goldstine, The Electronic Numerical Integratorand Computer, 2 MATHEMATICAL TABLES & OTHER AIDS TO COMPUTATION 97 (1946).
16. Williams, A Storage System for Use with Binary DigitalComputing Machines,
96 INST. ELEC. ENG'RS PRoC. Pt. 3 (1949).
17. Wilkes, The EDSAC, an Electronic Calculating Machine, 26 J. SCL INSTRUM.

385 (1949).
18. Kilburn, Digital Computers at Manchester University, 100 INsT. ELEc. ENG'RS
PRoc. Pt. 2 at 487 (1953).
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boards 19 that had to be manually rewired for each different operation or machine code. 20 Later models used internal instruction stor21
age as devised by Von Neumann of Princeton University.
In 1951, the Remington Rand Corporation introduced the first
commercial computer, the UNIVAC. 22 The following year, a group of
scientists at the Institute for Advanced Study completed MANIAC 1,
the first digital computer capable of operating on stored programs
instead of hard wired circuitry. 23 In 1953, IBM introduced the Model
650, a vacuum tube computer using a magnetic drum. The first commercial solid state computer was introduced by IBM in 1959 as the
model 7090.24 This computer quickly rendered tube computers
obsolete.

D.

SoFTWARE AND ALGORIrHMS

Computer operations are controlled by computer programssets of instructions for controlling the computer.25 Programs may be
in a visible format or stored in machine-readable form on punch
cards, on a magnetic tape or disc, or in a computer memory. Programs may be categorized as systems programs and applications
programs. Systems programs regulate the general operation of the
computer and control the allocation of machine resources in order to
facilitate the running of applications programs. Applications programs are employed by computer users to perform specific functions
for particular applications.
Programs are part of what the industry calls software. Software
includes programs, data, routines, back-up documentation,
flowcharts, and instruction manuals. The physical components of a
computer are called hardware. A computer operating in accordance
19. MacMillan, Floating Decimal Calculations on the IBM Card Programmed
Electronic Calculator, 5 MATHEMATICAL TABLEs & OTHER AIMS TO COMPUTATION 86
(1951).
20. Stiblitz, U.S. patent 2,666,579, filed December 26, 1944 and issued January 19,

1954.
21. Von Neumann, First Draft on a Report on the EDVAC, Rep. on Contract No.
W-670-ORD-492, Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA (1945).

22. Eckert, The UNIVAC System, JonTr AIEE-IRE COMPr. CoNF. Pnoc. 6 (1951).
23. Ulam, Computers, 211 Sci. Am. 203 (1964). Digital computers that have circuits
physically prewired to each other in a particular manner are generally referred to as
special purpose digital computers. These computers perform a limited number of
special operations. If the circuits are associated only by a program in the computer,
then the computer is referred to as general purpose digital computer.
24. Lanzarotta, Computing Power at Hunt.ille, 6 DATAMATION 18 (1960).
25. See In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 998 (C.C.PA. 1971) for an equivalent judi-

cial definition.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. InI

with a program performs an algorithm which may generally be defined as the step-by-step procedure for solving a problem in a finite
26
number of steps.
Algorithms for performing the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division date back to before 3000 B.C. when
the abacus was developed. 27 Today, algorithms are typically illustrated as flowcharts, stylized diagrams setting forth the steps of the
algorithm and their interrelationships. Flowcharts are then used for
expressing the algorithm in a manner (or language 28 ) that the computer can understand and that directs the hardware in its operation.
In a typical computer operation, a user reads in the data and the
programmed set of operations to be performed on that data. The instructions and data are then stored in the computer memory unit. A
control unit interprets the instructions and directs the central
processing unit (CPU) to perform the designated operations on the
data that was read in. The CPU then channels the answers to an
output unit that supplies the answer to the user.
E.

PATENTABILrrY OF SOFTWARE

Developing computer software requires an investment of time,
money and ingenuity. Once developed, however, such software can
be relatively easy to copy. Thus, software manufacturers, in order to
protect their interests in the software, often file patent applications
for their inventions. The grant of a patent provides the inventor and
his heirs or assignees the right to prevent others from making, using, and selling the patented software for a period of seventeen
26. The judicial definition of the term "algorithm" has varied significance depending upon the person defining the word. The Supreme Court, in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972), stated, "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem is known as an algorithm." The Court reiterated this definition in Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978), and in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186. The CCPA
defined the term algorithm as a method of calculating mathematical formulas and
mathematical procedures. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 761 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The PTO
Board of Appeals used the following dictionary definition in In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872,
876 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1978):
1. A fixed step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; usually a
simplified procedure for solving a complex problem; also a full statement of a
finite number of steps. 2. A defined process or set of rules that leads and assures development of a desired output from a given input. A sequence of formulas and/or algebraic/logical steps to calculate or determine a given task.
processing rules.
27. J. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 19.
28. Commonly used computer languages are FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), which is a mathematical problem-oriented code, BASIC (Beginners All Purpose Symbolic Instruction Code), ALGOL (ALGOrithmic Language), and COBOL
(COmmon Business Oriented Language).
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years. The United States Constitution delegates to Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...."29 Under
this authority, Congress enacted the Patent Laws (Title 35 of the
U.S. Code). The first requirement of this act limits the subject matter of a patent to a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. . . -30 The
second requires the claimed invention to pass four separate conditions of patentability: utility, 31 novelty,32 nonobviousness, 33 and ad29. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). "The term 'process' means process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
or material." Id. § 100(b). The term "process" has been further defined by the United
States Supreme Court as a series of actions upon certain materials that transforms
its subject matter from one state into another state or thing. Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780 (1877).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
32. Id. §§ 101, 102. Section 102 reads as follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States,
or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was
the subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for
patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate
filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the
United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who
has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371 (c)
of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,
or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.
In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
33. Id. § 103. Section 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.II

equacy of disclosure.?
36
35
It is well settled in patent law that ideas, scientific principles,
37
and laws of nature are not patentable. A process consisting solely
of mental steps is unpatentable since it would create a monopoly of
a disembodied idea. A novel process, however, is not unpatentable
because it incorporates laws of nature.
II.
A.

POLICY ISSUES
INDUSTRY APPROACH

As stated by the Supreme Court in Diehr, "[t Ihe broad question
whether computer programs should be given patent protection involves policy considerations... .,38 Entities that have primary concerns in the development and sale of software, affected by their
economic self interest and institutional bias, have favored patent
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made.
34. Id. § 112. Section 112 reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form.
Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be
construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which
it refers.
A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a
further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim
shall not serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple
dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is being considered.
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
35. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
36. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 402 (1854); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 108 (1853).
37. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
38. 450 U.S. at 216.
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protection for software. 39 Such protection would enable them to
compete more effectively with hardware manufacturers who supply
free programs with the purchase of their hardware. Since most
software manufacturing companies are relatively small, the prospect
of having other companies copy their product and offer it free to
their customers is dismal.
Software users, such as Bell Telephone Laboratories 4° and the
large oil companies, want patent protection to maintain or build
their prominence in particular areas of technology. Evidence of
such aggressive seeking of patent protection are the numerous apfiled in the seismic data processpeals to the CCPA that have been
41
ing area by major oil companies.
Spokesmen for the patent bar have consistently favored patentability for software. 42 Conversely, large hardware manufacturers,
such as IBM, have strongly disapproved of such patentability, since
43
the unrestricted use of their computers serves their best interests.

B.

PTO

APPROACH

The United States Patent and Trademark Office, concerned with
its ability to effectively process the large number of patent applications that would be ified in this area, has rejected patent applications for software. 4
During the early 1960's, the PTO found itself with a large
backload of patent applications and a four year average pendency
for an application before it was issued a patent. Due to budgetary
problems and archaic processing methods, the PTO and the patent
39. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
40. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Comments on Study of Computer Program Protection (Dec. 9, 1968) (response to views solicited by the PTO in 885 Off. Gaz. Pat.
Office 555 (1968)).
41. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809
(C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A.
1978); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
42. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Los Angeles Patent Law Association, Diamond v.
Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
43. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Business Equipment Manufacturers Association,
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Amicus briefs supporting the CCPA's conclusion in both Bradley and Diehr were fied by the American Patent Law Association, the Los Angeles Patent Law Association, Halliburton Services, Applied Data
Research, Inc., and Whitlaw Computer Systems, Inc. (joint brief). An amicus brief
urging reversal of the CCPA's decisions was fied by the National Semiconductor
Corporation.
44. 855 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 829-30 (1968).
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system were experiencing difficulties. Consequently, in 1965, the
President's Commission on the Patent System was established to
suggest revisions to the Patent Act. The policy considerations of the
Patent Office influenced the Commission to recommend against patent protection for computer programs. In its report the Commission
stated:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs
because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite
search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would
not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of
prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of proand the presumpgrams would be tantamount to mere registration
45
tion of validity would be all but nonexistent.
As early as 1964, the PTO denied the patentability of programs
because they were "creations in the area of thought. '46 In Ex parte
King and Barton,47 the PTO Board of Appeals presented its first
published opinion concerning the patentability of a digital computer
for mathematically processing, by Polish Notation, data stored
within the computer. The Board affirmed the Examiner's rejection
of the patent but disagreed with the Examiner's failure to distinguish for patent purposes the computer with the stored program
from any other computer absent such a program.
In 1966, the PTO set out to formulate standards for the patentability of software in its proposed first guidelines to Examination of
49
Programs. 48 The guidelines recommended that process claims
based solely on computer execution of mathematical formulas be
considered unpatentable because they merely provide for the transformation of data from one form to another.50 These guidelines also
set forth another class of process claims called "utility steps."
45. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS
OF. . . USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 13 (1966).
46. Puckett, The Limits of Copyright and Patent Protectionfor Computer Programs, 16 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81, 119 (1968).
47. 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 590 (1964).
48. 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1 (1966).
49. A patent application must be filed in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-13 and
115. Part of the patent application is the specification, which includes a disclosure of
the invention and one or more claims defining the invention. The claims legally define the scope of the invention for which an applicant seeks patent protection. Apparatus claims are used to define inventions falling within the statutory classification of
a machine. Method claims, also called process claims, are used to define inventions
that fall within the statutory classification of a process.
50. The guidelines stated:
Special problems of patentability arise in the computer, data processing
and automatic control field that revolve around mathematical processes and
equations. These problems may be more generically stated as the broad field
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These could be patented because a transformation in the state of a
general purpose computer resulted when operations software controlled the computer.5 ' Under these guidelines, apparatus claims for
programmable devices were to be patentable if the computer was
programmed into a special purpose machine. These guidelines were
withdrawn by the PT0 52 after hearings during which they were
strenuously opposed to by computer hardware manufacturers who
insisted that software users continue to have freedom of access in
53
order to promote and continue advancement in the technology.
The software firms, patent practitioners, and geophysical prospecting companies, took the position that computer technology and
software were merely other technologies and were entitled to equal
protection under the patent laws.
During Senate hearings on the Patent Reform Act of 1967,54 the
recommendations by the PTO were attacked for constituting "class
legislation" in that software manufacturers were denied rights equal
to those of hardware manufacturers. This reform bill died in cornof algorithms which are conclusions based upon a precise or mathematical
premise and line of reasoning.
For example the prediction as to the winner in a presidential election
made by a programmed 'general purpose' computer is based on an algorithm,
...which has been evolved from a line of reasoning based on known factors
and is analogous to the mathematical formula. Similarly, business practices
or methods may be reduced to an algorithm.
Mathematical process discoveries and mathematical formulas used
therein may not be patented although they may be of enormous importance
(e.g., E = mc 2 ).
829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 1.
51. To distinguish between algorithm and utility processes becomes difficult
in the case of a programmed general purpose computer unless the distinction
between a result of method or apparatus operation and the function of the
method steps or apparatus components is maintained.
The result of a programmed operation of a computer may be the mathematical transformation of data according to an algorithm but thefunctioning
of the computer is the change in state of certain electrical or mechanical devices within the computer according to the algorithm, as distinguished from
the individual or total computational results of the components thereof.
Thus a process, defined as a series of steps for the manipulation or evaluation of data, even though it is required to be carried out by a programmed
computer, would be an algorithm process. A process defined as a series of
steps for causing a sequence of changes in state of components of the computer, even though the sequence is dictated by an algorithm, would be a utility process.
Id. at 1-2.
52. 868 Oft Gaz. Pat. Office 349 (1969).
53. Report of the Hearings on the Patent Office's Guidelines to Examination of
Programs (1966).
54. Patent Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1042 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
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mittee. During House hearings in 1967, former PTO Commissioner
Brenner emphasized that the Patent and Trademark Office had little
pertinent prior art available to the examiners since there was a lack
of prior art patents and most of the literature was not in the Office's
possession.55 The Commissioner also noted the difficulty of finding
qualified examiners for this sophisticated technology, the lack of experienced personnel, and the inadequate examination procedures in
this area.
In 1968, the PTO, ignoring distinctions drawn in its 1966 proposal, set up examination guidelines that stated specifically that computer programming, whether claimed as a process or as apparatus,
was not patentable unless not obviously combined in an apparatus
that affected the physical transformation of a substance.5 6 Listed as
examples of such transformation were the knitting of a pattern or
the shaping of metals. The basic legal theory upon which the Office
premised this opinion was that a process that could be implemented
by purely mental acts was not within the scope of patentable subject matter and that a "process or method is directed to patentable
subject matter only if it is performed on physical materials and produces some appreciable change in their character or condition
....
These guidelines were rescinded 58 after the Court of Cus59
toms and Patent Appeals specifically rejected them.
In 1970, at the Patent Resources Group Conference, two PTO
Examiners proposed rules for governing the patentability of
programmable processes. 6° According to these rules, if a programmable process "has an intimate relationship to the machine, depending upon the machine's structure and organization and deriving
its significance from its interrelation with or exploitation of features
or characteristics of the machine, the process is statutory."'6 1 Specific applications of these rules to exemplary claims for applications
programs, control programs, input/output programs, and real-time
processing were provided. The PTO, however, did not officially
adopt these proposed rules.
",'

55. General Revision of the Patent Laws, Hearings on H.R. 5924, H.R. 13951, and
Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
cdong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 11, Pt. 1 at 37 (1967).
56. 855 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 829 (1968).
57. Id.
58. 858 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 349 (1969).
59. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.PA. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.PA 1969).
60. Conference on Software Patents, March 23-26, 1970, Dorado Hilton, Puerto
Rico (Examiners R.D. Bennett and D.C. Kaufman).
61. Id. at I-1.
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In 1971, the Justice Department, at the behest of private parties
who were opposed to patent protection for software, prompted the
PTO's appeal in Gottschalk v. Benson. The interoffice memorandum
sent by the Justice Department Appellate Section to its Patent Section states:
This memorandum is in response to a request from the Solicitor
General to the Civil Division for our recommendation as to appropriate action to be taken with respect to In re Benson and Talbot,
Patent Appeal No. 8376 (CCPA, May 6, 1971). The Patent Office has
apparently decided not to seek review of the line of decisions in the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which hold that computer
program methods may be the propersubject matter of a patent.
The Civil Division of the Department must decide whether we
should recommend filing of a petition for certiorari and, whether
the Civil Division of the Department of Justice is the proper Government agency to raise this appeal from the Court of Custom and
Patent appeals,.... Therefore, if review of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals' position is not sought at this time, the question
will have to be deferred for several years until an inter parties suit
ripens into an appeal to the Supreme Court. Private parties are
now urging that certiorari be sought so that they will be relieved of
62
this burden.

Attempts to formulate official guidelines for the examination
and patenting of software-related inventions were then abandoned
by the Office.
III. COURT DECISIONS
A.

MENTAL STEPS

In 1968, the CCPA began a series of decisions challenging the
previously presumed unpatentability of computer software. 63 The
early CCPA decisions rejected the Office doctrine of "mental
steps" 64 which contended that if the integral part of any process or
machine consisted of a "mental step," i.e., a function that was, or
could be, carried out in one's mind, then the invention that employed it could not be patented. This doctrine, as applied to
software, was based upon the argument that a computer operating
on a program implements an algorithm, a step-by-step procedure for
solving a problem. Therefore, a patent claim setting forth an al62. Interoffice Memorandum (May 27, 1971) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Musgrave, 431
F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
64. Substantial legal precedence existed for this doctrine. In re Yuan, 188 F.2d
377, (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.PA 1951).
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gorithm carried out by a computer would secure patent rights in the
practical implementation of the algorithm. This would be, in effect,
tantamount to a patent on the algorithm itself since the computer is
in the prior art and only the algorithm is novel.
In the CCPA's landmark decision in November, 1968, In re
Prater,65 the court held that,
[PJatent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence or
combination of steps, capable of performance without human intervention and directed to an industrial technology-a "useful art"
within the intendment of the Constitution-is not precluded by the
mere fact that
the process could alternatively be carried out by
66
mental steps.
The invention in that case was the spectrographic analysis of the
concentration of elements in a mixture of gases by a set of linear
equations to be run in either a general purpose digital computer or a
specially designed analog computer. The Patent Examiner found
the set of equations to be the sole novel aspect of the invention and
rejected both the process and apparatus claims as drawn to an unpatentable mental process that could be carried out with pencil and
paper alone. The CCPA distinguished this case from the Cochrane
v. Deener6 7 requirement that a physical transformation take place
and the presumption of unpatentable mental steps. The court decided that the definition of "process" as set forth in Cochrane and
argued for by the Office was misconstrued, was taken out of context,
and was inapplicable to the processing of mathematical data. As for
the "mental steps" doctrine, the court decided that where a process
is capable of performance without human intervention and directed
to an industrial technology, it is not precluded from patent protection merely because the process could alternatively be carried out
by mental steps. Where both the mechanical means for performing
the process are disclosed in the patent application and the mental
implementation of the process is unreasonable in light of the
description of the invention and the scope of the claims, the invention is patentable subject matter.
This decision was so startling and in such conflict with the Office's position that the Office petitioned and was granted a rehearing
on the case. 68 A strenuous dissent on the petition by Judges Rich
and Almond accused the Office of being more concerned with the
administrative problems and economic impact of the decision than
with the substantive issues involved.
65.
66.
67.
68.

415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.PA. 1968).
Id. at 1389.
94 U.S. 780 (1877).
415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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In the second Praterdecision, the CCPA avoided analyzing the
process rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 but reaffirmed the right of
patent protection for software and the court's reinterpretation of the
Cochrane decision. The court, however, found that the language of
the patent application disclosure failed to limit adequately the
claimed process to its machine implementation and, therefore, affirmed the Patent Examiner's rejection of the specific process claim.
The apparatus claim, which covered both the analog and the digital
mode of implementing the process, was allowed by the court.
In view of this decision, the PTO's 1968 Guidelines were withdrawn. Commissioner Schuyler stated:
We now will consider patent applications for computer programs on
the basis of the merits for the specific inventions sought to be protected rather than refuse consideration for reasons69 such as those
discarded by the Court in the Praterand Wei case.

B. IN RE

BERNHART

Four months after the second Prater decision, the CCPA ruled
in In re Bernhart70 that a computer that is programmed is physically
different from a computer without that program. The invention of
Bernhart was a method and apparatus for mathematically projecting a three-dimensional figure onto a two-dimensional surface from
any desired angle and distance on any desired plane by means of a
prior art computer and plotter. A general purpose digital computer
was utilized to solve a set of transformation equations. These solutions were used to drive the plotter in drawing the two-dimensional
representation. The Examiner had rejected the claims on the basis
that the novelty in the invention lay in the equation with which the
computer was programmed, and that the programming of the computer was predicated on mental steps and was, therefore, unpatentable. The court, upon review, found that since the apparatus claims
contained no recitation of mental steps and did not incorporate
human facilities they were within the statutory category of
inventions.
In reply to the argument raised by the Examiner that a
programmed computer was structurally equivalent to the same computer without that program, and that the addition of new signals to
the computer did not make the computer a new machine, the court
stated:
[I~f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way,
69. Woodcock, Mental Steps and Computer Programs, 52 J.
284 (1970).
70. 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.PA. 1969).

PAT.

OFF. Soc'y 275,
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it is physically different from the machine without that program; its
memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that these
physical changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to
conclude that the machine has not been changed. If a new machine
has not been invented, certainly a 'new and useful improvement' of
the unprogrammed machine has been, and Congress has said in 35
U.S.C. § 101 71
that such improvements are statutory subject matter
for a patent.
As to the method claims, the court found that although they
were directed to a statutory category of invention, they would have
72
been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art.
C.

IN RE MUSGRAVE

Within a year of the Bernhart decision, the CCPA in In re Musgrave,73 further broadened the categories of inventions that could
be patented. Musgrave's invention was a method of obtaining more
accurate recordings of seismograms in geophysical exploration by
obtaining weathering corrections through the use of a digital computer. The Examiner rejected the claims on the basis that one or
more steps in the process could be performed by mental acts and
therefore the process did not fall within the categories of patentable
inventions. The CCPA, in reversing the Examiner's holding and formulating its own standards for defining a statutory process, stated:
We cannot agree ...that these claims ... are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some or all the steps therein can
also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because
it may be necessary for one performing the processes to think. All
that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps in a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the
technologicalarts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional
purpose
to promote the progress of 'useful arts.' Const. Art. 1, sec.
74
8.

This holding broadened the qualifications for a "process" under
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include any sequence of steps that can be performed by a machine as opposed to a thinking person and that
serves to promote the useful arts. As noted by Judge Baldwin in his
concurring opinion, "very little remains of the 'mental steps' doctrine. ' 75 In the next two CCPA opinions in this area,7 6 the court
71. Id. at 1400.
72. The standard for obviousness is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
73. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
74. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 895.
76. In re Mcflroy, 442 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997
(C.C.PA. 1972).
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clearly stated that processes that have no practical value other than
enhancing the internal operations of a computer are a proper subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for patents.
D.

GOTTSCHALK V. BENSON

The United States Supreme Court first confronted the issue of
software patentability in the case of Gottschalk v. Benson. 77 Benson
and co-inventor Tabbot applied for a patent for a method of converting numerical information from one numerical base (Binary
Coded Decimal (BCD)) into another (pure binary) by the use of a
programmed digital computer."8 The patent application specifically
stated that the invention resided in the programming algorithm and
included the conversion subroutine. The invention was directed to
the problem of converting telephone numbers, dialed one digit at a
time, into the binary form, which is necessary for telephone interconnection. Each digit, when dialed on a telephone, generates electrical impulses that cause each digit to be stored in binary form.
Complete telephone numbers can then be stored in BCD format.
This BCD coded number must be converted to pure binary code for
it to be processed in conjunction with other telephone processing
routines. This process was used in Bell Telephone Systems No. 101
Electronic Switching System for both circuit switching and genera9
lized data processing.
The Patent Examiner rejected the claimed invention because it
included within its scope mental and mathematical steps which
were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.80
On appeal, a unanimous CCPA reversed the Examiner and
found that the sequence of steps set forth in the claims was within
the useful, technological arts, and therefore was patentable as a pro77. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
78. In both BCD and pure binary number systems all numbers are represented
by the arrangement of the digits "0" and "1." BCD is a hybrid of both the decimal
and the binary system. Like decimal, the digits zero through nine multiply powers of
ten to yield the desired number. The individual digits of the number, however, are
expressed in binary form.
79. During this time period, IBM developed its own electronic switching system,
Model 2750, which was marketed only in Europe. This system was in a competitive
position with the Bell Telephone PBX and Centrex systems. Paper on the IBM 2750
Voices and Data Switching System, 13 IBM J. RESEARCH & DEv. 408-55 (1969).
80. Only claims 8 and 13 of the patent application were litigated on appeal. They
read as follows:
Claim 8. The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary which comprises the steps of
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cess under 35 U.S.C. § 101.81 Judge Rich, writing the court's opinion,
noted that the invention as set forth in claim 8 is to be practiced on
a particular apparatus, a reentrant shift register. He also compared
the use of digital computers that manipulate signals representing binary numbers with cash registers, bookkeeping machines, and adding machines that manipulate numbers. Since the patentability of
these analog machines 82 had not been denied under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
he found that no reasonable distinction could be drawn against digital computers. Claim 13, which contained no specific recitation of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a binary '1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for
a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of said register.
Claim 13. A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number
representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position '1,' beginning with the least significant binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for a binary '0'
or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0 is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary '1' at the (i + 1) the and (i + 3)th
least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position
of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant decimal
digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant
decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of steps (1)
through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1972).
81. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972).
82. There are two basic types of modern computers, analog and digital. In analog
computers, data is represented as physical quantities instead of as numbers, and an
analog device computes by measuring the quantities through physical analog to the
phenomenon. Examples of simple analog computers are a thermometer and a slide
rule.
Digital computers represent data in the form of discrete numbers or digits, instead of physical quantities. Information is represented in the various components of
a computer in a form that requires only two distinct states of a storage position: "on"
or "off." The circuitry and mechanical apparatus used for storing one number in a
computer is known as a register. A shift register is a register within which a number
may be reoriented by a circular permutation. D. EADIE, INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC
COMPUTER 4-8 (1968).
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apparatus, was interpreted in light of the specifications and was considered to be implemented with a digital computer.
The PTO filed a petition for certiorari for Supreme Court review
of this case. In a 6-0 decision delivered by Justice Douglas, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the CCPA. 83 The Court
cited its decisions construing the meaning of the "process" category
of inventions,8 4 all of which were decided under previous patent
statutes, 85 and which had been superseded by the 1952 patent
laws.8 6 The Court did not, however, find a conclusive answer in
these cases to the question of whether the "process" category was
broad enough to include computer programs. The Court found that
granting a patent on the claims at issue would, in effect, preempt the
idea or algorithm embodied in the method, since the only practical
use for the algorithm was in a digital computer. The Court further
stated that innovations in the technology of processing data in digital computers are not patentable under the present statutes.
Contrary to the CCPA's decision, and even though claim 8 specifically called for the use of a reentrant shift register, the Supreme
Court found that the inventions described in both claims 8 and 13
could be performed without a computer and that these claims were
not limited to any particular apparatus. The claims were considered
to be so broad in scope that they included all possible applications
of the invention, and were thus capable of constituting a monopoly
on the algorithm itself.
The Court specifically stated that this decision does not preclude a patent for any program servicing a computer, does not extend to analog computers, and does not limit process patents to old
83. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell did not participate
in the decision.
At least 14 organizations filed amicus briefs in Benson. Among them were Honeywell, Inc., Burroughs Corp., I.B.M., Institutional Networks Corp., Computer
Software Analysts, Inc., Whitlow Computer Systems, Inc., Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc., Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, Applied
Data Research, Inc., and Data Processing Service Organizations, Software Products
and Service Section. Id. at 63-64. The hardware manufacturers sided with the Patent
and Trademark Office, while the software companies, the geophysical exploration industry, and the patent law associations sided with Benson and Tabbot.
84. Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935); Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1
(1888); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780
(1877); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 503 (15 How.) (1854).
85. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117;
Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
86. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1293 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
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technologies. 87 No ruling was reached on the mental step doctrine.
The Court failed to cite any of the CCPA's previous decisions
and obliquely recognized that the issue at hand was "a policy matter
to which we are not competent to speak."8 8 Citing several
paragraphs from the Report of the President's Commission on the
Patent System,89 the Court concluded its opinion by admonishing
the legislature that "considered action by Congress is needed." 90
The reluctance of the Court to formulate new policy and rules may
be attributed to the problems attached to appropriate proprietary
protection for software, as noted by Judge Rich of the CCPA, "Itjhe
technology is... mathematically awesome, the economic impact of
our decision tremendous, and the administrative problems of the
Patent Office horrendous .

..."91

In the intervening years between Benson and Dann v. Johnston,92 when the Supreme Court again decided to review a case concerning program patentability, the Patent Office continued to reject
software claims and relied heavily on Benson for authority in maintaining this position. The CCPA, on the other hand, attempted to
carve out sections of software technology for which patents could be
granted.
E.

IN RE CHRISTENSEN

The first case decided by the CCPA following Benson was In re
Christensen.9 3 The invention in Christensen was a process for determining the porosity of a subsurface formation in order to analyze
lithologic formations. The claimed method recited a series of prior
art steps for obtaining the necessary data and a novel equation for
computing the porosity of the formation. The Patent Examiner rejected the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103 stating that the alleged advance over the prior art resided in nonstatutory subject
matter: a novel quadratic equation. The Board of Patent Appeals, in
affirming the Examiner's rejection, emphasized that the applicable
claims were unpatentable under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The CCPA took this point of novelty approach in analyzing the
claims and found the equation, which was the crux of the invention,
to be the sole novel step claimed. The claims were therefore held
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

409 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Exec. Order No.11,215, 3 C.F.R. 299 (1965).
409 U.S. at 73.
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1392 (C.C.PA. 1968) (Rich, J., dissenting).
425 U.S. 219 (1976).
478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.PA. 1973).
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unpatentable. The addition of old and necessary antecedent steps
for establishing values for variables to be operated on was not sufficient to render the claimed method patentable. 9 4

F. IN RE JOHNSTON
The next case that addressed the patentability of a programmable invention, In re Johnston,95 was first decided by the CCPA
and then was appealed to and reversed by the Supreme Court. This
case was the first among many in which the CCPA overruled the
Patent Examiner and permitted patent claims combining apparatus
and process where the program was viewed as creating a new
machine.9 6 In patent applications in which the claims were directed
to computational steps per se, the CCPA found the inventions to be
94. The CCPA's point of novelty approach in this case and in the cases of In re
Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.PA 1951) and In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951) were
inconsistent in approach with later CCPA decisions. In Abrams the invention was directed to a hydrocarbon prospecting method wherein data was processed. The CCPA
found that the only technological advance in the claimed method resided in the
processing steps of "measuring," "determining," and "comparing" and that these
were purely mental steps and thus unpatentable. In Yuan the invention was directed
to a method of determining the airfoil profile most suitable for particular aerodynamic characteristics by particular mathematical relationships and procedures. The
CCPA found these steps to be purely mental and not a patentable process. The
CCPA first rejected this approach in In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), which
was subsequently vacated and replaced by an opinion that did not discuss propriety
of the "point of novelty" test. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The
CCPA reaffirmed its rejection of the "point of novelty" test in In re Musgrave, 431
F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), and pointed out the fallacy in that test:
[Ilt is our view that [the point of novelty test is] logically unsound. According to [this test], a process containing both 'physical steps' and so-called
'mental steps' constitutes statutory subject matter if the 'alleged novelty or
advance in the art resides in' steps deemed to be 'physical' and non-statutory
if it resides in steps deemed to be 'mental.' It should be apparent, however,
that novelty and advancement of an art are irrelevant to a determination of
whether the nature of a process is such that it is encompassed by the meaning of 'process' in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Were that not so, as it would not be if [the
point of novelty test] were the law, a given process including both 'physical'
and 'mental' steps could be statutory during the infancy of the field of technology to which it pertained, when the physical steps were new, and nonstatutory at some later time after the physical steps became old, acquiring
prior art status, which would be an absurd result. Logically, the identical
process cannot be first within and later without the categories of statutory
subject matter, depending on such extraneous factors.
Id. at 889.
95. 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219
(1975).
96. Among the others were In re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re
Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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unpatentable. 97 Inventions were patentable when the claims used
98
or applied the algorithm to achieve noncomputational results.

In Johnston, the invention was a computer program for controlling automated banking devices for machine handling of transactions, in particular, the sorting of checks into prearranged
categories. The Examiner had rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as an invention in a nonstatutory category. 99 The CCPA, by a
three to two decision, reversed all of the Examiner's rejections and
narrowly construed Benson to apply only to process type inventions. 10 0 Chief Judge Markey, in the dissent, found the claimed invention to be obvious in view of the prior art to those skilled in the
art of record keeping machines, 10 1 a position that the Supreme
Court later shared.
The Supreme Court reversed the majority opinion of the CCPA
but did not directly address the issues presented under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.102 The Court decided that Johnston's invention was obvious

and noted that its decision in Benson was a limited holding.
The PTO tried three times almost immediately thereafter to
have the Supreme Court address the issue of the patentability of
software related inventions. The first two attempts, In re Chatfield 10 3 and In re Noll,1°4 were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court
declined to consider the cases on the grounds that the Office's petitions in Chatfield were not timely filed and that the Noll application
was expressly abandoned by the applicant. The third petition, In re
Flook, 10 5 was accepted by the Supreme Court.
G.

IN RE FLOOK

The invention in Flook was a three step method for updating
alarm limits. A mathematical algorithm was used to compute the
values of environmental limits such as temperature, pressure, and
97. In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236
(C.C.P.A. 1977). See also In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
98. In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.PA
1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d
997 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
99. Other rejections were made under 35 U.S.C. § 112, for indefiniteness, and
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for obviousness to one of ordinary skill in the art. A rejection
that banking is a social science and therefore not a patentable technological art was
added by the PTO Board of Appeals.
100. 502 F.2d at 771.
101. Id. at 772.
102. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1975).
103. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
104. 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.PA 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
105. 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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flow rates in a catalytic hydrocarbon conversion process. These values were then used to update the process alarm limits. The first
step of the process measured the process variables value. The second step calculated an updated alarm limit value. The third step replaced the old alarm limit with the newly computed value.
The sole novelty in the claimed invention 10 6 was the mathematical algorithm used in computing the updated alarm limit value. Although the claims covered a large variety of potential uses of the
invention, they did not cover every conceivable application of the algorithm. The Examiner rejected the claimed invention as a nonstatutory subject matter.
The CCPA reversed the Examiner on the basis that although
the claim recited an algorithm to be used in carrying out the invention, it did not preempt the algorithm. The court also noted that a
sufficient step was present to render the claims patentable by making an adjustment to the alarm limit after solving the algorithm.
The PTO and Justice Department found this decision particu-.
larly unpalatable since knowledgeable patent practitioners could
easily draft claims for software related inventions by reciting a postsolution activity broad enough to cover an entire field of technology. 10 7 A patent on such claims would then preempt virtually all
uses of such claimed inventions.
The Supreme Court, in January of 1978, granted certiorari. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, reversed the
decision of the CCPA and disallowed the patent claims. The Court
found the invention unpatentable because the algorithm, like a law
of nature or a scientific principle, is assumed to be in the prior art.
The claimed invention, therefore, considered as a whole, contained
106. Claim 1 of Flook reads:
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least
one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical
conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of
Bo+K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset
which comprises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present
value being defined as PVL,
(2) Determining a new alarm base B 1 , using the following equation:
BI=Bo (1.0-F) + PVL (F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as B 1 + YKand
thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
437 U.S. at 596-97.
107. The Acting Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office stated that the
CCPA decision would have a debilitating effect on the software industry and would
require the Office to handle thousands of additional patent applications. Id. at 587.
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10 8

no patentable subject matter.
The Court further rejected the CCPA ruling that post-solution
activity in and of itself was sufficient to transform an unpatentable
invention into a patentable one. The test set forth for patentability
is whether the complete process as claimed, not just the algorithm
or formula, is new and useful. Laws of nature, such as algorithms,
could not be patented because they reveal a relationship that always
existed and as such are not the type of discoveries for which patent
rights were provided.
The Court, however, agreed with the CCPA that Flook's claims
would not wholly preempt the algorithm and would not in practical
effect be a patent on the algorithm. The Court, in affirming that
some computer programs may be patentable, stated that this decision should not be interpreted as "reflecting a judgment that patent
protection of certain novel and useful computer programs will not
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such
protection is undesirable as a matter of policy."' 0 9
The Court again noted its concern as to which software is suitable for patent protection and requested Congress to settle this difficult policy issue.
H.

HRSCHFELD V. BANNER

The first case to come up for review following Flook was Hirschfeld v. Banner.110 Chief Judge Markey of the CCPA, sitting by
designation in the district court, found that an invention increasing
the dynamic range for a digitally controlled television camera tube
whose output signals were stored in a digital computer was statutory subject matter. The court found that since the claims did not
directly or indirectly recite a mathematical algorithm the claimed invention could not be directed to a mathematical algorithm.
I.

IN RE SARKAR

Soon thereafter, Chief Judge Markey wrote the CCPA's first
post-Flook interpretive opinion in In re Sarkar.11 The invention in
108. By considering the algorithm in the
erations of novelty and obviousness under
tended to obfuscate the issues. In Nickola
decided one day after the Supreme Court
CCPA, sitting by designation, repudiated

"prior art," the Court interjected consid35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 U.S.C. § 103. This
v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978),
decision in Flook, Judge Markey of the
any consideration of novelty under 35

U.S.C. § 101.
109. 437 U.S. at 595.
110. 462 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem, 615 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
111. 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.PAL 1978).
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Sarkar was a technique for mathematically modeling the flow parameters of an open channel of a river obstructed by dams or
bridges, and which experiences flooding, has lateral or upstream inflow, or empties into a tidal body.
The CCPA affirmed the Examiner's rejection of the claimed invention as not being directed to a process within the scope of 35
U.S.C. § 101. The court found that Sarkar's claimed invention as a
whole consisted of a mathematical exercise, and as such did not
constitute an invented process for section 101 purposes. "Sets of
steps occurring only in the mind have not been made subject to patenting because mental processes are but disembodied thoughts,
whereas inventions which Congress is constitutionally empowered
to make patentable are tangible embodiments of ideas in the useful,
or technological arts."'112 The court also found the novelty or nonobviousness of the process to be irrelevant to its patentability under
section 101.
J. IN RE JOHNSON
The next case decided by the CCPA was In re Johnson.113 The
invention in Johnson was a computer-implemented method of ifitering noise from data obtained in seismic prospecting by analysis and
comparison of different parts of collected data. The Patent Examiner rejected all the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject matter. The CCPA, in a unanimous opinion,
reversed the Examiner. The court decided that Johnson's invention
was not merely a novel mathematical formula, as in Flook, but a
process designed to produce a recording of noiseless seismic traces.
Thus, since the result of the process was not just mathematical values, Johnson's claims passed statutory muster under the Flook
criterion.
The court then applied its two-pronged test, first formulated in
In re Freeman,114 to determine whether the claims recited non-statutory subject matter. First, the claims were reviewed to determine
whether they directly or indirectly recited process steps which were
themselves calculations, formulae, or equations. Second, the claims
were analyzed to see if they wholly preempt these calculations, formulae, or equations. As to the first test, the court found language in
the claims that suggested the execution of a mathematical algorithm
and, although no formula was specifically set out in the claims, one
was implicitly required. The court found that the claims did not
112. Id. at 1333.
113. 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
114. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.PA. 1978).
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merely define a method of solving a mathematical algorithm and
that the algorithmic steps of "determining" and "computing" were
incidental to producing a noise-free seismic trace.

K.

IN RE GELNOVATCH

The next two cases decided before the Supreme Court decisions
of Diehr and Bradley were In re Gelnovatchl l 5 and Arshal v. United
States.116 In Gelnovatch, a divided CCPA affirmed the Examiner's
rejection of the claimed invention as directed to a nonstatutory process. The invention was a process for determining a set of values for
use in a mathematical model of a microwave circuit. The model
used mathematical equations to describe the functional characteristics of the circuit components and the manner in which the components interrelated. Electrical components that matched those of the
model would permit building such a circuit and would have a specified response.
The court found the claimed invention similar to that in Flook.
Although the equations claimed did not determine an output value
from input values, this was not considered significant since in the
instant invention the answer was specified prior to performing the
calculations. The court stated that where "the claims solely recite a
method whereby a set of numbers is computed from a different set
of numbers by merely performing a series of mathematical compu117
tations, the claims do not set forth a statutory process."
L.

ARSHAL V. UNITED STATES

In Arshal v. United States, the Court of Claims considered an infringement' 18 suit against the United States. Arshal alleged that the
115.
116.
117.
118.

595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
621 F.2d 421 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d at 42.
Section 271 of Title 35 is entitled "Infringement of patent" and provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
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U.S. Department of the Navy had infringed his patent 19 to a directional computer.
The court found the situation here similar to that in Christensen
and granted the government's request for summary judgment. Particularly noteworthy in this decision are the court's statements that
although the claims at issue were in apparatus format and the
claims' preamble called for a "directional computer," the claims
were not within the statutory categories of invention because they
would nonetheless preempt the mathematical equation. This had
the effect of reducing the significance of the distinction between apparatus and process claims in cases of this sort.
This distinction between apparatus and process claims was also
dispensed with by the CCPA in In re Maucorps120 in which the court
stated that since the form of a claim is often an exercise in drafting,
the test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 applies without regard to such format use in the claims.
M.

IN RE WALTER

Of the two remaining cases decided by the CCPA, 12 1 In re Walter is more significant. Walter's invention was a method and apparatus for the processing of seismic exploration data using Fourier
transforms and cross-correlation by Cooley-Tukey algorithms. The
Patent Examiner rejected the claims on the basis that they were directed to the mathematical procedure outlined in the specification
for cross-correlating the sets of seismic signals.
In his opinion for the court, Judge Rich stated:
The determination of statutory subject matter under § 101 in the
field here involved has proved to be one of the most difficult and
controversial issues in patent law. The problem here, as we see it,
inventions per se; it is one of matheis not one of computer-related
122
matics-related inventions.
In analyzing the claims the court found that the specific end use recited, seismic surveying, did not save the claims from the holding in
Flook, since they were drawn solely to improve methods of calculaone or more of the following- (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts
which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
119. U.S. Patent No. 3,319,052, issued May 9, 1967.
120. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
121. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A- 1980); In re Philips, 608 F.2d 879 (C.C.P-A.
1979).
122. 618 F.2d at 764.
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tion. The court distinguished Johnson by noting that in Johnson a
noiseless seismic trace was produced, a physical product, while here
no physical product resulted.
The court also noted that Flook did not require a literal preemption of the algorithm of the invention. It found no conflict between
this and its Freeman test, which had been stated in terms of preemption, but went on to restate the second step of that test as
follows:
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a
whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in
apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process
claims), the claim passes muster under § 101. If, however, the
mathematical algorithm is merely presented and solved by the
claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and Flook, and is not
applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no
amount of post-solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor
is it saved by a preamble merely reciting the field of use of the
mathematical algorithm.
Various indicia are helpful in determining whether a claim as a
whole calls merely for the solution of a mathematical algorithm.
For instance, if the end-product of a claimed invention is a pure
number, as in Benson and Flook, the invention is nonstatutory regardless of any post-solution activity which makes it available for
use by a person or machine for other purposes. If, however, the
claimed invention produces a physical thing, such as the noiseless
seismic trace in In re Johnson, supra, the fact that it is represented
in numerical form does not render the claim nonstatutory. (empha123
sis in original).
This new test requires the mathematical algorithm to be implemented to define a structural relationship between the claimed elements, or to refine the claimed elements, or to refine or limit
physical process steps.
It was the applications of Bradley and Diehr that finally provided the impetus of the policy changes necessary to clarify and
simplify the categories of software-related inventions subject to patent protection.
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A.

DIAMOND V. BRADLEY

On April 21, 1975, John S. Bradley and Benjamin S. Franklin ap123. Id. at 767-68.
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plied for a patent on an invention for firmware, 124 which directs the
transfer of data within a computer. 125 A computer's hardware includes a main memory that has a system base 126 with which the
computer programmer can communicate. In high performance computers, where speed of operation is important, certain information
that is part of the system base may be stored in storage components
commonly called "scratchpad registers." Because these registers
are not, however, normally accessible to the programmer by means
of computer programs, changing the data they contain had been a
27
problem.
Bradley and Franklin claimed an invention that provided an impr3ved method for changing the data in the registers. In addition to
certain hardware elements, it employed firmware instructions.
When activated by software, the instructions caused a particular se124. Firmware has been defined as microprograms (programs that determine how
a computer interprets an instruction in machine language) resident in the computer's
control memory. Opler, Fourth Generation Software, 13 DATAMATION 22 (1967).
The term is generally used more broadly to define microprograms for multifarious uses so long as the physical mode of the program causes a particular sequence of
computer operations to take place.
125. Bradley's claimed invention, as described in Claim 1, states:
1. In a multiprogramming computer system having a main memory, a
central processing unit (CPU) coupled to said main memory, said (CPU)
controlling the state of a plurality of groups of processes being in a running,
ready, wait or suspended state, said computer system also having scratchpad
registers being accessible to an operating system for controlling said multiprogramming computer system, a data structure for storing coded signals
for communicating between said processes and said operating system, and
said scratchpad registers, said data structure comprising:
(a) first means in said data structure and communicating with said operating system for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of said processes;
(b) second means in said first means for storing coded signals indicating priority of said selected one of said processes in relation to others of said
processes for obtaining control of said CPU when ready;
(c) third means in said data structure and communicating with said operating system, for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of said plurality of groups of processes, and,
(d) fourth means coupled to said data structure and said scratchpad
registers, for generating signals causing the changing of information in said
data structure and said scratchpad registers.
In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 809 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affid per curiam by an equally divided
Court sub nom., Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
126. The system base controls the operation of the computer. It contains the process information used by the computer to carry out programmed operations.
127. To change the data in the scratchpad registers the programmer had to
reprogram the entire system base, a time consuming task, or use software limited to
that particular computer model, an option unacceptable to many computer users.
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quence of computer operations to take place. 128 An instruction in
the firmware developed by Bradley and Franklin permitted the
programmer to communicate with the scratchpad registers and to
switch data back and forth between the registers and the system
129
base in the main memory.
The Patent Examiner rejected the claimed invention as drawn
to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. He noted that
the hardware arrangement to which the claims referred-"a main
memory, central processing unit, and scratchpad registers"-were
"well-known components" that were "admittedly old in the art.' 130
The examiner found that the only novel aspect of the invention resided in an algorithm designed to control the multiprogramming
computer to solve the particular problem indicated. He concluded
that this "program implemented algorithm" was not patentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.131
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed with
the Examiner. It found that except for the microprogramming,
Bradley and Franklin's arrangement of hardware was old in the art.
It ruled that the fact that their claims were in "apparatus," rather
than "method," format did not make them any less "related to an algorithm." The Board added, "[a] claim for an improved method of
1 32
calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable.'
The CCPA unanimously reversed the Board, observing that
Bradley and Franklin were claiming a machine or apparatus composed of a combination of hardware elements that fell "literally
within the boundaries of § 101."133 The court recognized that this
combination also involves a portion of the computer's control store
that is microprogrammed in a particular manner and left standing
the Board's determination that the apparatus was old in the art and
that only the microprogram was new. It did, however, reject the
Board's "distillation of [the] claim down to the information con134
tained in the firmware."'
The proper analysis, said the court, involves determining
128. Bradley's firmware is stored in a control memory of the programmable read
only memory (PROM) type, which can be microprogrammed by the user.
129. When the programmer activates a "switch system base instruction," this initiates the execution of a microprogram that transfers the data.
130. 600 F.2d at 809-10.
131. The Examiner further noted in his answer before the Patent and Trademark
Office Board of Appeals that microprogrammed control units like Bradley's were also
old in the art.
132. 600 F.2d at 810-11.
133. Id. at 812.
134. Id. at 813.
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whether the claimed invention preempts the use of an algorithm.
Applying this test, it stated that there was no mathematical algorithm here. Although certain calculations were made, they did
not "transform the invention as a whole into a method of calculation"'135 because after the invention's task was completed there was
no solution of an equation.
In essence, the court found the invention to lie in the combination of tangible hardware elements and not in the information embodied in these elements. The court then applied its two-pronged
test first formulated in In re Freeman.136 First, the claims were reviewed to determine whether they directly or indirectly recited process steps which were calculations, formulae, or equations.
Secondly, the claims were analyzed to see if they wholly preempted
these calculations, formulae, or equations. Using this test the court
found that no mathematical algorithm was present and that the invention as a whole was not a method of calculation.
The PTO then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, citing the need for efficient administration of the patent system and
the CCPA's unwillingness to apply the analysis of the claims required by the Supreme Court under Flook. The PTO noted its difficult position in this situation, stating:
The importance of this case transcends its particularfacts and
the lower court's evident unwillingness to apply Parker v. Flook.
That unwillingness is confirmed by a number of other cases in

which the CCPA has similarly adhered to the analysis of the dissent in Flook, rather than the opinion of the Court. In re
Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32 (1979); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1081
(1978); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1332-1333 (1979). The CCPA's interpretation of Benson and Flook is highlighted in In re Diehr, 602
F.2d 982 (CCPA 1979), reh. denied (Oct. 18, 1979), a case involving a
mathematical algorithm similar to the one involved in Flook. We
plan to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in Diehr shortly. We
suggest that it be considered with this case, and that it would be desirable for the two cases either to be consolidated for argument in
this Court or to be heard in tandem.
In light of the consistent rejection of Flook by the court below,
review of this Court is of prime importance to efficient administration of the patent system. The Patent and Trademark Office presently has pending more than 3000 patent applicationsin which the
patentability of computer software or firmware is a potential issue.
Some 1200 applications involve mathematical algorithms; over 1800
involve nonmathematical algorithms. Unless this Court grants re135. Id.
136. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.PA. 1978). Freeman was decided prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Flook; however, the test was not affected by the Flook decision.
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view now, the CCPA's approach, exemplified by the decision below,
puts the Commissioner in an untenable position. Should he follow
the analysis required by the CCPA, he would be untrue to Flook,
would usurp congressional function by expanding the scope of the
patent laws (see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518, 531 (1972)) and withal would settle nothing in the law, for the
issues of patentability would remain to be litigated in infringement
suits (see 35 USC 281 et seq.; 28 USC 1338). On the other hand,
should he continue to adhere to his view that computer programs
are themselves unpatentable, there is the gloomy prospect of years
repeated, costly and unsuccessful litigation in the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. This Court in Flook strongly intimated that
computer programs are not patentable under current law. See 437
U.S. at 595. A definitive ruling to that effect would correctly leave to
Congress the decision whether and how to extend the patent laws
to computer programs, would greatly facilitate administration of the
patent system, and would forestall the unsettling effects of a
(and ultimately invaproliferation in the economy of unauthorized
137
lid) patents on computer programming.
An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA's decision, but made no statements as to their reasons or the merits of the
138
arguments presented.

B.

DIAMOND v. DIEHR

The invention in Diehr is a process that uses a computer for regulating the curing time of raw rubber in a mold press. Rubber products produced from a mold press are cured under heat and pressure
in the press for a specified time. The time needed to obtain a good
cure depends in part on the temperature inside the press, which is
regulated by a thermostat. 139 It is possible, using well-known time,
temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate when to open the
press and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, uncontrolled
variables present in the actual curing process, such as heat loss during loading of the press, make it difficult to calculate exact temperature. For this reason, the industry practice is to calculate the cure
time as the shortest time in which all parts of the product definitely
will be cured, assuming a "reasonable amount of mold-opening
time" during loading and unloading. The disadvantages of this practice are that erring on the side of caution will usually lead to
137. Petition for certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley, at 12 (emphasis added).
138. 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (per curiam). Chief Justice Burger took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
139. The geometric configuration of the press and the viscosity of the rubber when
it enters the press are important factors in computing the cure time.
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overcuring the rubber, while keeping the mold open for more than a
"reasonable" time will often result in undercuring.
Diehr's claimed invention employs a digital computer to determine a more precise cure time. 14° Measurements of the temperature in the closed, heated press are made at frequent intervals.
Each measurement is automatically fed into the computer which
then recalculates the cure time. When the recalculated cure time
equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press was closed,
the computer signals a device to open the press.
The Patent Examiner rejected the claimed invention on the sole
ground that the claims were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. He determined that those steps in Diehr's
claims that are carried out by computer under control of a stored
program are nonstatutory under the Supreme Court's decision in
Benson which held that innovations in the technology of processing
data in digital computers are unpatentable. The remaining stepswhich relate generally to the method of manufacturing precision
molded articles, such as the opening, closing, and heating of the
mold-the Examiner found to be "conventional." The Examiner
concluded that the claims defined and sought protection of a computer program for operating a rubber molding press.
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed with
the Examiner and unanimously affirmed the rejection. In analyzing
the claims, the Board found much that was either within the prior
140. Claim 1 of the 11 claims appealed reads:
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at
least,
natural logarithm conversion data (in),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of
the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press
for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each
cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is

In v=CZ+x
where v is the total required cure time,

repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during
the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with
the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates
equivalence.
In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 983-84 (C.C.PA. 1979).
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art, such as the constant measurement of the mold temperature, or
that involved post-solution activity, such as the automatic opening
of the press. The "calculation" recited in the claims, observed the
Board, showed that Diehr's system employed an algorithm. The
Board summarized: "[TJhe only difference between the conventional methods of operating a molding press and that claimed ...
rests in those steps ... which related to the calculation incident to
the solution of the mathematical problem or formula.' 14 1 The Board
concluded that this calculation, Diehr's "contribution," was a "computer program of the character" that is nonstatutory. 14
The CCPA reversed the Board of Appeals. 14 It agreed with the
Board that Diehr had "disclosed a computer program," but it stated
that this "does nothing to aid in the determination of compliance
1
It held that the
with § 101" and is not "of any significance."'"
Supreme Court's decision in Flook (if a claim recites an algorithm,
then the algorithm is to be considered as part of the prior art) was
merely a convenient vehicle for finding that the method of calculation used in Flook was nonstatutory. The case did not establish a
general test for determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus,
the court refused to identify and set aside, as had the Board, those
steps in the claim that were old in the art, stressing that, "considerations of novelty and obviousness have no bearing on compliance
with § 101." 145 The CCPA instead considered the claims, as a whole,
and found that they recite a process or method for molding rubber
articles at whose "heart" is a molding press, not an equation or
method of calculation. Since this process constituted an improvement over prior processes, and since those processes were patentable, the court concluded that Diehr's process was likewise
patentable.
For substantially the same reasons set forth in its petition for
certiorari in Bradley, the PTO petitioned the Supreme Court for review in Diehr. The Supreme Court published its opinion in Diehr almost one week prior to its decision in Bradley. In Diehr, a 5-4
decision with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, the
Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA's decision and found the claimed
invention could be statutorily categorized as an invention. The
Court began its decision by noting its portentious decision from the
previous term, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,1 6 in which it held that an
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
447

at 984.
at 989.
at 985.
at 987.
U.S. 303 (1980).

The aflirmance of the CCPA position was by a 5-4 major-
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invention of a man-made bacterium for breaking down crude oil was
within the statutory categories of invention set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. The Court also rejected the PTO argument that living things
were excluded from patent protection under section 101 until Congress expressly authorizes their patentability.
As in Chakrabarty,the Diehr Court analyzed 35 U.S.C. § 101 and
cautioned, courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."'147 In considering the category of invention of "process," the Court equated
the term "process" with the term "art," a category of invention in
the Patent Act of 1793,14 and noted that the terms were interchangeable. For example, analysis of the eligibility of a patent claim
for a "process' does not change when the term "process" is exchanged for the term "art" in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court cited the
Congressional Committee Reports, which accompanied the 1952 Patent Act, as indicative that Congress intended patentable subject
matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."
1
(emphasis added). 49
Diehr's claimed invention involved the transformation of an article, raw uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing.
The Court thus differentiated Diehr's invention from the inventions
in Benson and Flook. The sole practical application of the mathematical algorithm in Benson was its connection with the programming of a general purpose digital computer. Such an algorithm was
considered similar to a law of nature and consequently not subject
to patent protection. Flook's invention was directed to computing an
alarm limit (a number). The claims in Flook sought to protect the
formula for computing that number. Diehr, on the other hand, was
found not to be generally preempting the mathematical equation
employed in his process except in conjunction with all the other
steps of his claimed process.
The basic position of the PTO was that the claim should be dissected under a point of novelty approach and that the algorithm
should be considered as part of the prior art. The Court emphatically stated that the claims must be considered "as a whole.' 150 The
analysis suggested by the Office, noted the Court, would undermine
ity, led by Chief Justice Burger. The assignee of the patent is the General Electric
Company.
147. Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199

(1933)).
148. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, § 1.
149. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6; S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprintedin 11952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2399.
150. 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
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earlier decisions regarding the criteria that should be considered in
determining eligibility of a process for patent protection. Furthermore, contrary to its indication in Flook, the Diehr Court found that
considerations of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 are "wholly apart
from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject
matter."'15
In regard to post-solution activity, the Court ruled that insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Citing Flook in this regard, the Court
stated:
A mathematical formula does not suddenly become patentable subject matter simply by having the applicant acquiesce to limiting the
reach of the patent for the formula to a particular technological use.
A mathematical formula in the abstract is nonstatutory subject matter regardless of whether the patent is intended to cover all uses of
the formula or only limited uses. Similarly, a mathematical formula
does not become patentable subject matter merely by including in
the claim for the formula
token postsolution activity such as the
52
type claimed in Flook.1
The four dissenting Justices began their opinion with a review
of the history of computers and computer-related patent law. This
review consisted of a critical analysis and summary of the CCPA decisions beginning with In re Tarczy-Hornoch15 3 and ending with In re
Diehr.'5 The dissent found the CCPA's approach to 35 U.S.C. § 101
throughout the twelve year duration between these cases to be "expansive."' 15, The Diehr dissent also found that the CCPA's postFlook decisions tended to "trivialize" the Court's holding in
Flook.156
The dissent believed that Diehr had invented an improved
method of calculating the time that a mold should remain closed
during the curing process and not, as held by the majority, a method
of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a rubber
molding press. This conclusion was based upon three reasons.
First, Diehr's patent application fails to assert that there is anything
unusual about the temperature reading devices used in this process.
Second, devices for constantly measuring actual temperature were
well-known in the prior art. Third, the sole difference between con151.
152.
153.
154.
(1981).
155.
156.

Id. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.PA 1979)).
Id. at 192 n.14.
397 F.2d 856 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
602 F.2d 982 (C.C.PA 1979), affd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
450 U.S. at 205.
Id.
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ventional methods of operating a molding press and Diehr's method
relates to the calculation of the mathematical problem or formula
used to control the mold heater and the automatic opening of the
press. Thus, the dissent found that Diehr's discovery is a method of
using a digital computer to determine the amount of time that a rubber molding press should remain closed during the synthetic rubber
curing process. This determination of the time parameter was found
to be similar to the computed alarm limit value in Flook. The essence of the inventions in both Diehr and Flook were therefore
found to be in their respective algorithms which could be programmed on a digital computer.
The correct mode of analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to determine
what constitutes a patentable process, according to the dissent, is to
assume that all of the steps of the process are novel, unobvious, and
useful. The claimed invention is then reviewed in order to ascertain
what the inventor considers his inventive concept to be. If the invention is found to be a mathematical algorithm, then it is unpatentable since an algorithm is a law of nature and as such is not a
patentable process within the meaning of section 101.
The dissent in Diehr did not grant any legal significance to the
post-solution activity of the algorithm because such activity did not
constitute any part of what the applicants actually discovered.
Since such activity was not novel, it was argued that it should be legally inconsequential regardless of whether or not it was significant.
In reference to the broader question of whether computer programs, per se, should be given patent protection, the dissent reiterated the Court's previous position in Benson and Flook that because
of the complex policy considerations involved, the Court is not authorized to address the issue. The dissent concluded that the decision should be made in its appropriate forum-Congress.
C.

PTO

PRACTICE AFTER BRADLEY AND DIEHR

By mid-March, 1981, less than one month after the Supreme
Court decisions, a committee had been formed by the PTO to draft
new guideline proposals for patent examination in software-related
cases. 57 Meanwhile, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals reviewed the apposite cases then under appeal in light of the
Supreme Court decisions in Bradley and Diehr. By August 1, 1982,
at least thirty-eight applications had been reviewed and decisions
rendered. These decisions by the Board indicate that a majority of
the Board members desire a change in policy toward more favorable
157. Mark Nusbaum, a Senior Primary Examiner, was named Chairman of the
Committee.
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treatment in the patenting of software-related inventions. Of the
thirty-eight appeals decided by the Board, twenty-one were reversals of the Examiner's position, fifteen were affirmances of the Examiner, and two were affirmances in part. The ratio of reversals to
affirmances was substantially higher than it was before the
Supreme Court decisions in Bradley and Diehr.
In the majority of appealed applications, the Board applied the
two-part test of Freeman as modified by the CCPA in Walter.15 8 The
claims were first analyzed to determine if they recited nonstatutory
mathematical algorithms as defined in Benson. Claimed inventions
not containing such algorithms were found to be within the statutory categories of invention. If the claims did recite mathematical
algorithms, then they were considered as a whole to determine
whether the algorithm transformed at least one element of the invention into a different state or thing. If such a transformation occurred, then the claims were considered to be within the statutory
categories of invention.
Inventions that concern processes for modeling physical events
or elements and that claim to perform mathematical operations
have been found to be unpatentable by the Board. The Board particularly emphasized that operations on synthetic (hypothetical)
signals, the results of which have no necessary relationship to actual
signals that might be derived from actual measurements, are nonstatutory subject matter.
Inventions that derive values of physical parameters of an entity
by mathematically processing data obtained by actual measurements have been found unpatentable by the Board. The Board considered the derivation to be a simulation of something physical by a
process akin to mathematical modeling and in line with the CCPA's
pre-Diehr decision in Walter. The Board found that inventions directed at the filtering of data by mathematical algorithm processing
were patentable in view of the CCPA's ruling in Johnson and that
inventions directed to determining the direction and identity of
targets emitting radiation were patentable since the end product
was not a pure number.
In considering whether a "physical conversion" had taken place,
the Board looked to both the environment and the post-solution activity of the claimed invention. Secondary factors, such as the recitation of necessary antecedent steps that establish or provide values
for variables in a mathematical algorithm, were found not to convert
an otherwise nonstatutory method into one that is statutory. In one
158. 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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Board opinion, l s 9 the majority opined that a numerical end product
of an algorithm can be considered a "physical thing" if it indicates
physical aspects of an entity. Similarly, limiting the claimed invention to a particular art or technology and/or claiming merely the recording of the output of the mathematical algorithm did not render
otherwise nonstatutory subject matter a statutory category of
invention.
In one of the four dissenting opinions of the thirty-eight Board
decisions reviewed, one Board member admonished the Board to be
cautious in applying precedents of the CCPA that were decided
before Diehr. In this Board member's view, Diehr should be taken
as the last word, "the new testament," of the Supreme Court and all
reasoning should stem directly from that opinion until the CCPA
60
has an opportunity to interpret it on a case-by-case basis.
This dissenting Board member reversed his pre-DiehrBoard decision which had affirmed the Examiner's rejection of the claimed
invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a nonstatutory category of invention. Analyzing the claimed invention as to whether
patent protection was being sought for an algorithm in the abstract,
he found that the appellant was not seeking a patent merely for a
mathematical formula. As the environment of the invention was set
forth in the claims, the dissenting member argued that citizens who
perform the algorithm per se are not infringing on appellant's
claims. The opinion concluded with the note that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun
that is made by man'; Diehr, 209 USPQ at page 6, quoting the Com161
mittee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act."'
D.

IN RE TANER

The validity and viability of this dissenting opinion was upheld
by the CCPA in In re Taner.162 The invention in Taner is a method
of seismic exploration by which substantially plane or cylindrical
seismic energy waves are simulated by combining (summing) reflected signal traces engendered by conventional spherical seismic
163
waves.
159. Claims that the Board finds unallowable, such as the ones discussed in this
section, are "abandoned." These Board decisions, therefore, are not made a matter of
public record.
160. Not public record.
161. Not public record.
162. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
163. Taner's claimed invention, as defined in his first claim, reads:
1. A method of seismic exploration by simulating from substantially spherical
seismic waves the reflection response of the earth to seismic energy having a sub-
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In conventional seismic exploration methods, seismic sources
generate seismic energy waves that radiate through the earth in
spherical or near-spherical wavefronts. Reflections of the spherical
waves are detected and recorded. The recorded signals, which contain information concerning geological substrata traversed, are
processed in order to make the information more discernible.
Taner's invention implemented the repeated use of a specific arrangement of a seismic source and a group of detectors along a line
of survey so that the reflection signals obtained by the detectors for
each source position were combined. The combined signal represents the response of the earth to a substantially continuous
wavefront over an extension of seismic source or receiver positions
of dimensions that are large with respect to the wavelength of the
seismic energy. Thus, although the seismic source produces substantially spherical waves, the combined signal represents, for a
point along the seismic line, the reflection response of the earth to a
downwardly traveling plane or cylindrical wave having vertical ray
paths.
The Patent Examiner rejected the claimed invention because
the method of seismic data treatment operated on general purpose
computers and recited a mathematical algorithm that does not constitute patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.164 He reasoned that since the claims define a method of seismic data
treatment that is not limited to any apparatus, the claims preempt
all implementations of the claimed mathematical and manipulative
operations upon the seismic data.
The PTO Board of Appeals initially applied the test established
by the CCPA in Freeman and Walter and affirmed the Examiner's
rejection. This decision was formally rendered one week after the
stantially continuous wavefront over an extent of an area being explored having at
least one dimension which is large relative to a seismic wavelength, comprising the
steps of:
(a) imparting the spherical seismic energy waves into the earth from a seismic
source at a source position;
(b) generating a plurality of reflection signals in response to the seismic energy
waves at a set of receiver positions spaced in an array over an extent having at least
one dimension which is large relative to a seismic wavelength; and
(c) summing the reflection signals to form for the source position a signal simulating the reflection response of the earth to seismic energy having a substantially
continuous wavefront over at least one dimension which is large relative to seismic
energy wavelength.
681 F.2d at 788.
164. The Examiner additionally rejected the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. This rejection was affirmed by the
PTO Board of Appeals and reversed by the CCPA. Id. at 788-89.
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Supreme Court's decision in Diehr. In response to a post hearing
brief filed by the applicants, the Board reviewed its prior decision.
A majority of the tribunal reaffirmed their prior decision and found
that the claims recited a mathematical algorithm and that since no
close relationship existed between the algorithm and the other process steps, except that the signals to be summed are generated by
the precedent process steps, the claims would preempt the algorithm. The Board found that limiting the claimed invention to geophysical prospecting, and thus not literally preempting the
165
algorithm, was insufficient to render the claim statutory.
The applicants attributed the dissenting member of the Board
with "excellent vision" in that he "did not see the emperor's new
still in existence despite
clothes which the majority insisted were
66
the Diamond v. Diehr denouncement."'
The CCPA began its opinion with a reiteration of the principal
that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are unpatentable since they are not embraced within the terms of 35
U.S.C. § 101. Taner's claimed invention, however, was found to be
directed to a technique of seismic exploration that involves a mathematical algorithm and not merely to the solution of a mathematical
algorithm and consequently to the obtaining of a patent for the algorithm in the abstract. The court found that the conversion of
spherical seismic signals into a form representing the earth's response to cylindrical or plane waves was a statutory process under
section 101 even though the signals were mathematically expressed
67
physical apparitions.
The court's previous decision in Christensen, which utilized the
"point of novelty" approach in affirming the rejection of a claimed
invention to determine subsurface formation porosity by prior art
data collection and a mathematical equation, was specifically over168
ruled in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diehr.
E.

ABELE, PARDO AND MEYER

Presently pending before the CCPA are at least three cases
which bear directly on the issue of the patentability of software-related inventions. The claimed inventions at issue in these appeals
are image processing169 by computed tomographic 7 0 scanners, a
method of controlling the internal operations of a programmed com165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Appellant's Brief at 11, In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P-A. 1982).
681 F.2d at 790.
Id. at 791.
"Image processing" has been defined as the capture, storage, an interpreta-
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puter, and a process and apparatus for identifying locations of probable function and/or malfunction in a complex system.
In In re Abele, 171 the majority of the Board of Appeals affirmed
the Examiner's rejection of the claims directed to image processing
where the actual value of each point in the X-ray image is subtracted in a digital filter from the average value of all image points in
a surrounding region. This differential value is substituted for the
actual value of the image point and is displayed as a gray scale
value. The Board applied the two-part test of Freeman and Walter
and found that the claimed invention fell into a nonstatutory category of invention. On appeal to the CCPA, Abele characterized his
172
invention as a direct visual representation of internal organs,
while the PTO Solicitor characterized the invention as a mathematical model or simulation of conventional moving film tomography.
In In re Pardo,173 the PTO Board of Appeals affirmed the Examiner's rejection of the claimed invention, stating that the claims constituted a proscribed algorithm even though the algorithm was not,
prima facia, mathematical. Pardo contends that the claimed invention controls the internal operations of a programmed computer in a
nonsequential mode and thereby improves the computer itself. The
PTO solicitor, in addition to supporting the Board's opinion, argues
that since Pardo's entire specification is addressed to businessmen
and their needs and that the only example provided in the specification concerns sales accounting, the process claimed should be considered a method of doing business, which is nonpatentable subject
174
matter.
In In re Meyer,175 the PTO Board of Appeals affirmed the Examiner's rejection of the claimed invention 176 basing its decision on the
two-step test of Freeman and Walter. The PTO Solicitor further
characterized Meyer's invention as "[a] t most,. . . a FORTRAN protion of information in the form of an image, and the improvement of images that are
not of optimum utility for the purposes at hand.
170. "Computed tomography" is the art of producing cross-section images of the
interior of a plane through measurements made along lines lying in the plane
through a body from a series of projected images which depicts integral plane. Typically X-rays are projected through the body along a large number of paths and the
integrated attenuation of the radiation along each path is measured. The measured
data is to determine separately an attenuation coefficient at each of a large number of
points in the plane.
171. Appeal docketed, No. 81-618 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
172. Brief for Abele at 3, In re Abele, appeal docketed, No. 81-618 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
173. Appeal docketed, No. 81-619 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
174. In re Wart, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
175. Appeal docketed, No. 82-510 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
176. Claim 1 reads:
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gram for a general purpose digital computer" that results in a set of
numbers which designates the locations of probable function and
malfunction in complex systems. 177 Meyer, on the other hand, contends that the claimed invention would not wholly preempt the algorithm recited and that the numerical output should be considered
similar to digital displays on common testing or measuring apparatus such as volt meters.
These three cases will allow the CCPA to make further clarifications and guidelines regarding the patentability of software and
firmware-related inventions, although Diehr, Bradley, and Taner already indicate the court's broadening scope in this area.

F. GUIDELINES
The following guidelines may be helpful in drafting or reviewing
claims directed to algorithm or other software-related inventions.
(1) Prospective claims should be analyzed to see if they "directly or indirectly" recite a mathematical algorithm, whether it is
in mathematical symbology or in prose format. If the claims at issue fail to "directly" recite a mathematical algorithm, then reference should be made to the specification to determine whether
claim language indirectly recites mathematical calculations, formulas, or equations. If no mathematical algorithm is recited, then the
claims have passed the first of the dual Freeman tests required by
the CCPA and no further inquiry into this issue is necessary.
(2) If the reviewed claim is found to recite a mathematical algorithm, then further inquiry should be made as to whether or not
the claim seeks patent protection for a formula in the abstract. For
this investigation, the claim should be viewed as a whole, without
A process for identifying locations of probable malfunction in a complex system, said process comprising the steps of:
(a) selecting a plurality of elements in the complex system, said elements having known locations;
(b) initializing a factor associated with each of said elements;
(c) testing the complex system for a response, which response, if effective, requires proper functioning of certain said elements, the probable iden-

tity of at least some of these certain elements being known;
(d) determining whether said response of the complex system was at
least partially effective or ineffective;
(e) modifying the factor associated with at least some of said elements
known to be possibly involved in the response in accordance with the effectiveness of the response; and
(f) repeating steps (c), (d) and (e) for further responses of the complex
system to obtain resultant factors for at least some of said elements, whereby
said resultant factors are indicative of probable malfunction of their associated elements and thereby indicative of probable malfunction at the locations
of these elements.
U.S. PTO Application No. 465574 (filed Apr. 30, 1974).
177. Brief for the Patent and Trademark Office at 4.
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dissecting the claim into old (prior art) and new elements and then
ignoring the old elements in the analysis. In order to avoid stating
a claim that is essentially a mathematical calculation in the abstract, the claim should set forth transformations of articles, signals,
or physical steps into different states or entities and the interrelationship between the algorithm and articles, signals, or physical
steps. The addition of such physical manipulations or transformations to the claim indicates that the algorithm is only a part of the
overall process or apparatus and not an abstract method of
calculating.
(3) Significant environmental background, such as the specific
technology and/or the use of the invention's apparatus should be
recited to narrow the scope of the claims so that they will not preempt the algorithm per se. Setting forth claim limitations that are
directed to the particular type of computer used in processing the
algorithm is not sufficient to make the invention patentable. The
Board has found that regardless of the type of computer used, the
invention may be unpatentable, since it " . . . defies logic to urge
that a process is directed to a mathematical algorithm when practiced on a general purpose digital computer but is not directed to a
mathematical algorithm when practiced on a special purpose digital
computer."'178 Since there is substantial question whether words in
a preamble that do not appear in the body of a claim may be used
to limit the scope of the claim, unambiguous terminology should be
used.
For example, in Arshal,179 in which the United States Court of
Claims considered the validity of a software-related invention, the
term "directional computer" was found to be ambiguous concerning
the exact technology to which that invention was directed.
(4) The recitation of presolution activity that includes more
than just the necessary antecedent steps for obtaining values required for the algorithm can be evidence that the algorithm is only
a portion of the invention. The addition of old (prior art) and necessary antecedent steps of establishing values for variables in the
mathematical algorithm may not convert an unpatentable method
or apparatus into patentable subject matter. Even the recitation of
data gathering steps that are novel and unobvious, in combination
with mathematical computing steps, may be insufficient to give rise
to a patentable claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101.180
(5) Significant post-solution activity, clearly defined in the
claim, is a factor indicating that the algorithm is part of a process.
Necessary post-solution steps, such as displaying output data, are
generally not considered significant. For example, updating alarm
limits by transmitting electrical signals that represent the results of
178. Not public record.
179. Arshal v. United States, 621 F.2d 421 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077.
180. See, e.g., In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.PA 1977).
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calculations obtained by an algorithm was found by the Supreme
Court in Flook to be insignificant post-solution activity. On the
other hand, deriving specific temperatures and times for curing rubber using an algorithm was found by the Supreme Court in Diehr to
constitute significant post-solution activity.
(6) Claims that are otherwise equivalent to process claims but
that are drafted in an apparatus type format of "means for" (functional) terminology, should be analyzed in the same manner that
process claims are analyzed. The fact that these function type
claims may be categorized as directed to a machine is irrelevent to
considerations under the Freeman test.
The Court of Claims observed in Arshal that "the line of demarcation between a patentable and an unpatentable (or non-patentable) claim does not always shimmer with clarity." 18 1 Following the
above recommendations can help prevent drafting claims that would
preempt the algorithm rather than define an invention which is performing a function that the patent laws were designed to protect.
V. PATENT ACTIVITY ANALYSIS
The present legal status of patentability of software-related inventions has been explored. The patenting process in a typical
software "technology," seismic data processing, will not be discussed. Of primary interest is the effect that the changing legal status surrounding patentability of this technology has had on patents
granted in this area. Also of interest are the actors in the technology, the country or tate from which the patents originate, and the
activity trends in this technology.
Due to the difficulty of obtaining patents for inventions in certain areas of data processing, it would be expected that many developments in methods of seismic data processing are not patented.
Furthermore, the propensity to patent in this area should be affected by the changing judicial opinion during the period from 1960
to 1978. Favorable judicial opinions should encourage filings,
whereas unfavorable opinions should have the opposite effect.
In the analysis which follows, the characteristics and trends in
seismic data processing are identified. Also examined is the impact
of conflicting court decisions and questionable patentability on the
number of patent applications filed.
A previous OTAF publication reported on patent activity trends
in all of seismic data processing. 8 2 This report focuses only on seis181. 621 F.2d at 431.
182. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 7822895, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST, EIGHTH REPORT 85 (1978).
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mic data processing patents in which software-related technology is
an issue.
A.

SUBJECT AREA

Seismic exploration can be defined broadly as the analysis of
the earth's structure and composition using physical measurements
of acoustic or shock waves (seismic waves) taken at or near the area
to be studied. Generally, the area to be studied is hidden from direct view and lies under thousands of feet of soil and rock. Such exploration is used primarily in prospecting for valuable natural
resources, including hydrocarbons (oil, gas, coal), minerals, and
water.
In a typical seismic survey, measurements of reflected or refracted seismic waves are made over the earth's surface, parallel to
it, or in a wellhole. These measurements contain variations in
space, amplitude, and time of the seismic waves. The nature of the
seismic waves is determined in part by the nature and structure of
the subsurface. Due to their complexity, received seismic waves
must be quantitatively processed to help determine the nature of
the substrata. This complexity is caused by many factors, including
the numerous types of seismic waves, the different velocities and
paths travelled by the seismic waves, and the variations in their
attenuation.
Improvement of the usefulness and quality of received seismic
wave data is achieved by a number of processes, some simple and
others fairly specialized and sophisticated. Seismic signal processing inventions for which patents were filed prior to 1960 were generally fixed arrangements of circuit components (analog systems)
designed to perform the claimed methods. During the 1960's digital
processing techniques were introduced. Due to their generally
higher speed, lower expense, and greater versatility, these techniques displaced most analog processing systems. Thus, modern
seismic exploration typically uses digital computers to control field
operations, facilitate digital recording and handling of data, process
the data, and provide modes of data display that permit faster and
more accurate data interpretation.
This area of technology was selected for discussion purposes for
a number of reasons. First, it is an area of widespread interest and
impact. During 1980, more than three billion dollars was spent by
the free world for geophysical exploration. 183 Ninety-four percent of
this amount was spent on seismic exploration, while the remaining
183. Senti, GeophysicalActivity in 1980, 46 GEopHysics 1316 (1981).
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six percent was spent on electromagnetic, magnetic, radiometric,
and gravitational exploration. Almost one-half of the expenditures
for geophysical exploration during 1980 took place in the United
States. This represents an increase of forty percent over spending
in the field during 1979. Secondly, seismic data processing is basically a United States technology, thereby minimizing the problem of
data error resulting from omission of foreign technological developments that are not patented in the United States.
B.

PROCEDURE

The first step in the patent analysis was to identify software-related patents. This was done by defining the area of seismic data
processing in terms of subclasses, the smallest units of the Patent
Classification System. Once this was accomplished, these subclasses were manually searched to identify software-related patents.
The patent data obtained was cross-checked by comparing the data
to United States patents that have International Patent Classification designations which relate solely to processing seismic data.
Then, the listing of software-related patents granted between January, 1960 and December, 1980 was used to generate standard OTAF
profile reports containing the following patent information:
PatentActivity Data-Patent activity was tabulated by the patents'
application filing date. Patents distributed by application filing date
are referred to in this study as patented applications. For the most
part, the analyses utilize these patented application data because
the application filing date more accurately reflects when the technology was developed and when the inventor or assignee had the
propensity to seek patent rights.
In general, patented application data is available for the period
1960-1978. Data for 1979-1981 is incomplete because many patent applications that were filed in these years are still pending final approval by the Patent and Trademark Office.
Assignment Data-Assigned patents in this technology were extracted and tabulated by assignee and application filing date.
Foreign Activity Data-Foreach patent the country of origin, as indicated by the residence of the first listed inventor, was recorded.
Data was tabulated by the year of application filing and is reported
as a percentage ("percent foreign") of the total patented applications filed in the area in each year. This information is useful in determining the position of the United States in this technology
compared to foreign countries.
State of the Inventor Data-The state of residence of the first listed
inventor was recorded for all patented applications that originated
in the United States. The percentage of patents granted to each
particular state to the total patents granted was calculated. this in-
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formation is of interest in determining the level of activity in this
technology for particular states.
C.

TREND ANALYSIS

The graph in Figure 1 shows the variance in numbers of patented applications (solid line) for each year from 1960 through 1978,
the timing of judicial and policy decisions affecting the patentability
of software, and the number of seismic crews searching for oil and
gas in the United States by crew months (dotted line). The number
of seismic crews prospecting is considered to be a leading indicator
of oil and gas exploration activity. 184 An increase in the number of
active seismic prospecting crews engenders an increase in the
amount of seismic data obtained. As more data is obtained, the demand for data processing increases. In the face of mounting data
processing requirements, better techniques have been developed
through innovation in processing of the data. Thus, a correlation
might be expected to exist between seismic exploration activity and
the number of patented applications fied for inventions in this field.
In the early 1960's, the number of patented applications increased from a low of twenty-eight in 1961 to a high of sixty-five in
1966, a dramatic increase of 132%. During this period no judicial decision directly related to the issue of software patentability was rendered, permitting inventors normal access to patent protection.
Only the PTO Board of Appeals' 1964 decision in Ex parte King and
Barton 8 5 obliquely addressed this issue at that time. The rejection
in that case was under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and questioned the obvious
nature of the invention. The Board, in dictum, stated that a computer with a program stored within it is patentably distinct from
86
other computers without such a program.
In 1966, the PTO proposed guidelines 8 7 would have permitted
patenting of "utility step" inventions, i.e., inventions that cause a
184. 46 GEOPHYSICS at A-64, A-65 (1981). These figures are compiled from data reported by oil companies operating company-owned seismic exploration crews and by
contract seismic exploration companies.
185. 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 590 (1964).
186. Id. at 591.
187. 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1 (1966).
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transformation in the state of the computer. The guidelines would
not, however, permit patents for claims based on computer execution of mathematical formulas. In the two year period following
these proposed guidelines, the number of patented applications
dropped precipitously from sixty-five to twenty, a decline of 69%.
A portion of this decrease may be attributed to the decline in
the number of seismic crew months over this period. In 1966, 300
crew months of exploration took place, while in 1968, there were
only 270 crew months. This trend of decreasing exploration activity
continued until 1970 when it reached a low of 190 crew months of exploration. From 1970 to 1978, the number of seismic crew months increased to 350. As depicted by Figure 1, however, the number of
patented applications over this eight year period remained fairly
steady at approximately twenty-two patented applications per year.
The lack of increased patented applications in this field after
1969 also appears to be related to the PTO's continued rejection of
claimed software-related inventions following the withdrawal of its
1966 proposed guidelines.
In 1970, the CCPA decision in In re Musgrave 188 allowed claims
relating to a method for obtaining better seismograms. The process
at issue in Musgrave used a digital computer to obtain weathering
layer corrections for seismic data. This decision, for a brief period
of over one year, broadened the scope of patentable software-related
inventions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson1 89 reversed the CCPA's allowance of claims directed to a method of converting numerical information from one numerical base into
another. Although the Supreme Court specifically stated that its decision did not preclude a patent for any program servicing a computer and did not extend to analog computers, it failed to specify the
types of software-related inventions that would be patentable. Thus,
the decision severely curtailed the prior standards of patentable invention set forth by the CCPA in Musgrave.
Only a small drop in patented applications occurred in the two
year period following the Supreme Court's decision in Benson. In
view of the sharp increase in seismic crew activity for this period,
the slight change may be indicative of the large number of patented
applications that normally would have been filed.
From 1973 to 1978, the CCPA sought to set up parameters by
which the patentability of software-related inventions could be determined. During this period, the PTO appealed four of the CCPA
188. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
189. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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decisions to the Supreme Court. 190 In the two cases that the
Supreme Court decided to hear the CCPA was reversed and the
claimed inventions were found not patentable. 19 1 Thus, for the decade from 1968 to 1978, the continuous changes in the metes and
bounds of what constitutes a patentable software-related process
may have discouraged the filing for patents in this area. Although
prospecting activity during this time almost doubled, the patenting
decreased.
Figure 2 indicates the yearly percent share 192 of the total patented applications from 1966 to 1978 for seismic data processing and
for all technologies. During this period, 329 patented applications
were received for seismic data processing and 824,300 patented applications were received for all technologies.
The trends indicated by this graph for seismic data processing
are analagous to those in Figure 1, except that they are presented
here as yearly percent shares, rather than as numbers of patented
applications. An additional dimension of comparison is presented
by observing the fairly level rate of patented applications for all
technologies during this time period in comparison to the erratic
changes in the seismic data processing area. Of the total patented
applications in the area of seismic data processing, 21% were filed in
1966, while 6.1% were fied in 1978. The 1.2% drop in patented applications for all technologies from 1977 to 1978 is partially attributable
to the pendency period for applications filed in 1978 and the lower
than normal number of patents granted in 1979. A number of such
applications, significant enough to affect this 1.2% drop, may still be
pending in the PTO and awaiting issuance. In light of this, the increase in patents relating to seismic data processing from 1977 to
1978 may be even larger than indicated and may portend a significant upward trend in the patenting of software technologies.
D.

OWNERSHIP AcTrIvrry'

93

Which firms are obtaining patents for seismic data processing190. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978); In re Noil, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.PA. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In
re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S.
219 (1976).
191. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
192. "Percent share" equals the number of patented applications per year divided
by the total for the 1966-1978 period times 100. For example, a constant level (same
number of patent applications per year) over a 10-year period would result in a
straight line graph at the 10% level.
193. Patenting for corporations mentioned in this section includes that of
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FIGURE 3
1960 - 1978 CORPORATE PATENTING IN
SEISMIC DATA PROCESSING
NUMBER AND % SHARE OF ASSIGNED PATENTED APPLICATIONS
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related inventions that use computer software and/or algorithms?
subsidiaries where they could be identified. For example, "Schlumberger" includes
patents assigned to Schlumberger Technology Corp., Schlumberger Instruments et
Systemes, Schlumberger Ltd., Schlumberger N.V., Schlumberger Overseas
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As expected, the large oil companies, such as Pan American Petroleum, Mobil, Texaco, Continental, Exxon, and Shell, are obtaining
the major share of patents issued.
As shown in Figure 3, Pan American Petroleum owns the largest
share of patents in this field; however, companies that specialize in
providing seismic instrumentation and field service, such as Texas
Instruments, Schlumberger, and Western Geophysics, own a substantial portion of the patents granted. Of all the major assignees in
this area, only one, Societe Nationale Des Petroles D'Aquitaine, is
clearly a foreign-based corporation, although Shell and Schlumberger are U.S. affiliates of foreign multinational corporations. Of
the sixty-five different assignees for the almost 400 patents considered, thirty-two assignees owned only one patent each. Thus, approximately one-half of the assignees own approximately 92% of the
patents in this technology.
For the three year period from 1976 to 1978, 84% of all patented
applications in this field were assigned to corporations. This is only
12% more than the 72% average for all technologies over the same
period. Approximately 8.8% of the patents during this time were assigned to the United States or foreign governments. This is almost
seven times more than the all-technology average of 1.3% for the
same time period.
Ownership of foreign origin inventions by United States companies is substantially higher in this area of technology than the overall technology average of 8.7%. Of the patented applications granted
to foreign resident inventors during this same three year period,
70% are assigned to U.S. corporations or other U.S. business entities. Not included in this figure is the number of patents that were
assigned to foreign business entities owned wholly or in part by U.S.
companies. The inclusion of such patent data in this ownership activity assessment would indicate that an even larger share of foreign
origin patents are owned or controlled by the United States. This
reflects the substantial amount of research and development of this
technology in foreign countries that is sponsored by U.S. companies.

E.

FOREIGN PATENT AcTrvrrY

The percentage of patented applications in this field granted to
foreign resident inventors for the three year period from 1976 to 1978
is only 12%, or about one-third of the all-technology average of
37.7%.
Messgeratebau UndVertrieb, Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., and Schlumberger
N. & Cie.
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Figure 4 discloses the country of origin of foreign developed
technology as identified by the residence of the first named inventor
on U.S. patents. French residents received the largest number of
patents granted to foreign resident applicants in this area-41%.
Residents of the United Kingdom and Canada received 31% and
18% of the patents, respectively. Resident inventors of West Germany, the U.S.S.R. and the Netherlands received the remaining 10%
of these patents. Residents of Japan, who were awarded more patents between 1963 and 1980 than any other foreign country except
West Germany, received no patents in the area of seismic data
processing. Likewise, Switzerland, which ranks fifth among foreign
countries for the number of U.S. patents received, had no patents in
this technology awarded to its resident inventors. Thus, if innovation in this technology is exemplified by patenting, then the residents of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and
Canada dominate the field.
FIGURE 4
FOREIGN ORIGIN PATENTING IN
SEISMIC DATA PROCESSING
1960- 1978
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Figure 5 compares the two-year percent shares of the 1967-1978
totals of foreign origin patented applications in seismic data
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processing and in the all-technology category. The rapid growth rate
of foreign origin patented application fflings in seismic data processing during the 1967-1974 period is shown by the increase in percent
share from 5.7% in the 1967-1968 time period to 22.9% for the 19731974 period. From 1974 to 1978, however, the percent share declined
steadily to a low of 11.4%. This decline can be partially attributed to
the reluctance of inventors and assignees to file patent applications
relating to software or algorithms when the PTO is rejecting such
inventions.
As depicted by Figure 5, all technologies, as a group, consistently increased in yearly percent of patented applications from 1967
to 1974, and then recorded a slight decline of 1.2% from 1974 to 1978.
Thus, it can be seen that the fluctuations in patented application
filing shown in the seismic data processing field are not merely a reflection of the trend in all areas of technology.
F.

PATENT

AcTvrrY By

STATE

FIGURE 6
STATE SHARE OF U.S. PATENTED APPLICATIONS
IN SEISMIC DATA PROCESSING
1960- 1978
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Figure 6 illustrates the percentage of patented applications by
U.S. inventors from 1960 though 1978, categorized by the state of the
first listed inventor. Except for Alaska, the states having the largest
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commercial gas and oil fields had the largest number of patented inventions related to processing seismic exploration data. Texas and
Oklahoma together received 77% of all patents in this area. Other
oil and gas producing states, such as California, Pennsylvania, and
Louisiana, together received only 12% of the patents. Connecticut,
where the Schlumberger Technology Research Center is located,
and Massachusetts, where various university research centers are
located, received 3% and 2% of the patents, respectively. California,
the state having the largest number of resident patentees for all
technologies over this time period, received 9% of the patents in this
technology. New York's resident inventors, who received the second
largest number of patents for all technologies over this time period,
received less than 1% of the patents in this technology.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rapid growth of general purpose computer usage over the
last decade, for both industrial and home use, has resulted in a
greater demand for software. This growth, along with innovations
developed to apply software to new and existing technologies, has
led to an increased number of patent applications in the many fields
that utilize computers. The Supreme Court's decisions in Diehr and
Bradley and the CCPA's recent decision in Taner have opened new
vistas for artisans seeking to protect their software-related inventions through the use of the patent system. Viewing these factors
together with the world's expanding need for information acquisition, processing, display, and control systems, the prospect of a sizeable increase in patent applications regarding software-related
inventions seems inevitable.
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APPENDIX*
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
SECTION 2110: PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTERMATHEMATICAL ALGORITHMS OR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 209 USPQ 1 (1981) and Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381, 209
USPQ 97 (1981) significantly affect an examiner's analysis under 35
U.S.C. 101 of patent applications involving mathematical equations,
mathematical algorithms and computer programs.
In 35 U.S.C. 101, Congress has set forth the categories of inventions or discoveries which may be patentable as consisting of "any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Inventions involving mathematical equations, mathematical algorithms or computer programs, if statutory at all, would fall into the categories of
statutory subject matter as processes, machines or manufactures.
In constructing 35 U.S.C. 101, the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1, 6 (1981) and Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 206 USPQ 193 (1980), has applied a broad
interpretation to statutory subject matter so as "to include anything
under the sun that is made by man."
The Supreme Court also reiterated that certain categories of inventive activity should not be considered statutory subject matter.
As set forth in Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1, 7 (1981), "Excluded
from such patent protection are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198
USPQ 193 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673
(1972). A "scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not a patentable invention," Mackay Radio Corp. & Telegraph Co. v.
Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94, 40 USPQ 199, 202 (1939). In
Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, the Court concluded that an "algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent." Similarly, the Court in Parker v.
Flook, supra, held that an improved "method for computing 'an
alarm limit'," where the application "did not purport to explain how
the variables used in the formula were to be selected, nor did the
application contain any disclosure relating to the chemical
processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm of adjusting
* The following section is reprinted from the
PROCEDURE § 2110 (1982).
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the alarm limit," is unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101.
(See Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1, 10 (1981)).
If the claims of an application are directed solely to one of the
above judicially excluded areas of inventive activity, it is clear that a
patent shall not issue. However, a claim is not unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. 101 merely because it includes a step(s) or element(s) directed to a law of nature, mathematical algorithm, formula or computer program so long as the claim as a whole is drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory. In this regard, the following significant
points of law may be gleaned from the Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ
1 (1981) decision:
1. The "claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claim into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis." . . ." The
'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter
of a claim falls within the 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter." (emphasis added).
2. "When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent
laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101."
3. "When a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific
principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into
whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in
the abstract." (If the claim does not seek protection for such a
mathematical formula, it would be non-statutory under 35 U.S.C.

101).
4. "A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment." . .. "Similarly, insignificant post solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process."
5. When a claim as in Parker v. Flook, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), is
drawn "to a method for computing an 'alarm limit' (which) is simply
a number," the claim is non-statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101 because
Flook "sought to protect a formula for computing this number."
6. "It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection." Citing Funk Bros. Seed Co.
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v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 USPQ 280 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1853); and
LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1852).
35 U.S.C. 101 CLAmn

ANALYsis

In determining eligibility for patent protection under 35 U.S.C.
101, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1 (1981), requires that the "claims must be considered as a whole." Consistent
with this requirement, the Court concluded that "a claim drawn to
subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory
simply because it uses a mathematical formula, a computer program, or digital computer." Thus, the fact that a claim specifies that
a computer performs certain calculation steps is irrelevant for the
purpose of determining whether statutory subject matter has been
recited. The fact that an application discloses that a mathematical
formula is implemented solely by computer programming is likewise immaterial for this purpose.
The Court's requirement that the "claims must be considered as
a whole" in effect leaves viable the CCPA's two-step procedure set
forth in In re Freeman, 197 USPQ 464, (CCPA, 1978), as an appropriate test for determining if a claim involving mathematics and/or
computer programming is in compliance with 35 U.S.C. 101. See also
In re Walter, 205 USPQ 397 at 407 (CCPA, 1980) for clarification of
the second Freeman step. In accordance with the first step of such
analysis, each method or apparatus claim must be analyzed to determine whether a mathematical algorithm is either "directly" or
"indirectly" recited. If the claim at issue fails to directly recite a
mathematical algorithm, reference must be made to the specification in *orderto determine whether claim language indirectly recites
mathematical calculations, formulas, or equations.
If a given claim directly or indirectly recites a mathematical algorithm, the second step of the analysis must be applied. Under this
step, a determination must be made as to whether the claim as a
whole, including all its steps or apparatus elements, merely recites
a mathematical algorithm, or method of calculation. If so, the claim
does not recite statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101.
The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1 (1981),
provides some guidance in determining whether the claim as a
whole merely recites a mathematical algorithm or method of calculation. The Court suggests that if "a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function
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which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming
or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101." (emphasis added)
Focusing on the application or implementation of a mathematical algorithm, the Supreme Court in Diehr, 209 USPQ 1 at 89 (1981),
citing Mackay Radio Corp. and Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 306 US 86, 94, 40 USPQ 199, 202 (1939), explained that
"while a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the
aid of a scientific truth may be." In this regard, the CCPA noted in
In re Walter, 205 USPQ 397 at 407, (CCPA, 1980), that "If it appears
that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements
of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps
(in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim
passes muster under § 101."
The Supreme Court in Diehr also indicated that "insignificant
post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process." The claims in Parker v. Flook, which
were held to be nonstatutory, recited a post-solution activity of updating a number (i.e., an alarm limit), a step relating more to a
method of calculation than to the physical process alluded to in the
claim preamble. In Diehr, the Supreme Court characterized the
post calculation activity of the type claimed in Parkerv. Flook as being "token post-solution activity." In contrast, the post-solution activity in the Diehr claims consisted of automatically opening a
rubber molding press, a step clearly tied in with the physical process of rubber molding. As stated by the CCPA in In re Walter, 205
USPQ 397 at 407, (CCPA, 1980), "if the end-product of a claimed invention is a pure number, as in Benson and Flook, the invention is
non-statutory regardless of any post-solution activity which makes it
available for use by a person or machine for other purposes."
It must also be recognized that even though a claim contains an
application limiting preamble, even though it does not cover every
conceivable application of a formula, or even though it does not totally preempt the formula, such a claim would be non-statutory, if,
when considered as a whole, it merely recites a mathematical algorithm or method of calculation. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Diehr, 209 USPQ 1 at 10, (1981), "A mathematical formula does
not suddenly become patentable subject matter simply by having
the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of that formula to a
particular technological use." Similarly, the CCPA pointed out in
Walter, 205 USPQ 397 at 409 (1980) that "although the class preambles relate the claimed invention to the art of seismic prospecting,
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the claims themselves are not drawn to methods of or apparatus for
seismic prospecting; they are drawn to improved mathematical
methods for interpreting the results of seismic prospecting. The
specific end use recited in the preamble does not save the claims
from the holding in Flook, since they are drawn to methods of calculation, albeit improved. Examination of each claim demonstrates
that each has no substance apart from the calculations involved."
Also, in Walter, a Jepson preamble was not regarded as limiting
the "subject matter as a whole," so as to avoid the § 101 rejection.
Similarly, preliminary data gathering steps may not affect the "subject matter as a whole" assessment. In re Richman, 195 USPQ 340,
(CCPA 1977). Moreover, even the concluding step of building a
bridge or dam may not suffice. In re Sarker, 200 USPQ 132 (CCPA,
1978). In other words, for purposes here, the "subject matter as a
whole" must be viewed in context on a case by case basis.
In analyzing computer program related claims, it is essential to
recognize that computer implemented "processes are encompassed
within 35 U.S.C. 101 under the same principles as other machine implemented processes, subject to judicially determined exceptions,
inter alia, mathematical formulas, methods of calculation, and mere
ideas." In re Johnson et al, 200 USPQ 199 at 210, 211 (CCPA, 1978).
In accordance with the two-step procedure outlined above, claims
seeking coverage for a computer program would be non-statutory
under 35 USC 101, only if, when considered as a whole, they merely
recite a mathematical algorithm, or a method of calculation. Such
an approach is the same as that contemplated for apparatus claims
by the CCPA in In re Bradley and Franklin, 202 USPQ 480 (CCPA,
1979).
Certain computer program related claims may be non-statutory
under 35 U.S.C. 101 as falling within judicially determined exceptions outside the mathematics area. For example, consider the following claims:
(1) "A computer program comprising the steps of:
a) associating treatment rendered to a patient with a fee, and
b) billing said patient in accordance with the fee."
Here the computer program is claimed, not in terms of a specific
instruction set, but alternatively as a series of steps broadly defining
what the program is designed to accomplish. Such a claim should
be viewed as nonstatutory under 35 U.S.C. 101 as reciting a method
of doing business.
2) "A computer program for comparing array A(N) with array
B(M) to generate array C comprising the steps of:
Do 70 N = 1, 10
Do 80 M = 1, 20
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B(N) then C(M) = B(M)
80 Continue

70 Continue * * *"

This bare set of instructions fails to recite subject matter that
falls within any statutory category. In this regard, a bare set of computer instructions does not set forth a sequence of steps which
could be viewed as a statutory process. Such a computer language
listing of instructions, when not associated with a computing
machine to accomplish a specific purpose, would not constitute a
machine implemented process, but would constitute non-statutory
subject matter as the mere idea or abstract intellectual concept of a
programmer, or as a collection of printed matter.
Further guidance on handling 35 U.S.C. 101 issues may also be
gleaned from the CCPA's detailed claim analysis in the following
decisions: In re Chatfield, 191 USPQ 730 (CCPA, 1976); In re Johnson, Parrack and Lundsford, 200 USPQ 199 (CCPA, 1979); In re
Sarker, 200 USPQ 132 (CCPA, 1978); In re Gelovatch and Arell, 201
USPQ 136 (CCPA, 1979); In re Bradley and Franklin, 202 USPQ 480
(CCPA, 1979); In re Walter, 205 USPQ 397 (CCPA, 1980).
In addition to handling 35 U.S.C. 101 issues in accordance with
the above analytical approach, it should be emphasized that examiners must also carefully examine mathematical algorithm or computer programming related applications to insure that they comply
with the disclosure requirements of Section 112 as well as the novelty and unobviousness requirements of Sections 102 and 103.

